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ABSTRACT 
When operating in a sea borne environment, sea mines can prevent U.S. 
Navy vessels from meeting operational objectives.  Sea mines have the potential 
of damaging, or destroying ships at sea.  The U.S. Navy conducts mine warfare 
(MIW) operations to meet this threat.  Although effective against mining, our 
countermining operations are currently employing 1960’s technology in an 
attempt to keep pace with new Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).   
Today’s legacy MIW processes currently employed by the warfighter, 
although capable of countering the mining threat, are a reactive process that is 
slow to engage and employ assets that are cumbersome to operate.  With the 
advent of new technologies, a transformation of MIW capability is on the horizon 
and has the potential of influencing how the U.S. Navy maintains maritime 
dominance in the open-oceans and littoral environments.  
      The influence that technologies bring to MIW includes multi-spectral 
sensors, laser imagery, compact modular systems, unmanned and semi-
autonomous weapons, as well as new communications architecture and tactics.  
Although these technical innovations present a level of capability superior to the 
existing legacy systems, developmental barriers and the lack of an overarching 
systems architecture will hinder or prevent these systems from being effectively 
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The U.S. Navy’s objectives for projection of power and superiority of the 
seas are accomplished by its ability to place strategic assets anywhere in the 
world at anytime.  Although the U.S. Navy is an effective and capable naval 
force, when operating in littoral environments, the threat of sea mines presents a 
complex challenge that can deter, or deny access to littoral environments and 
ultimately reduces the ability for the U.S. Navy to meet its objectives.   
Mines have been successfully used as weapons at sea since the 
American Civil War.  Today’s more sophisticated sea mines employ technologies 
that enhance their firing logic, and stealth capability as well as their lethality.  The 
U.S. Navy employs a mine countermeasures triad of airborne, surface and 
underwater assets to meet the sea mine threat.  Today’s countermine triad has 
been effective against the pre-Cold War mining threat, but as technology has 
changed the capabilities of mines, so too must the U.S. Navy’s mine 
countermeasures change. 
 The U.S. Navy employs 1960’s technology and tactics in an attempt to 
keep pace with new CONOPS, which are designed to counter the capabilities of 
today’s more sophisticated sea mines in a more complex littoral environment.  
Although capable of countering the mine threat, dedicated mine warfare units are 
a reactive force that is slow to engage and cumbersome to operate in the next 
generation mine threat environment.  Today’s MIW capability requires 
restructuring if it is expected to keep pace with tomorrow’s CONOPS.  With the 
advent of new technology, a transformation of MIW capability is on the horizon 
and has the potential of influencing how the U.S. Navy maintains maritime 
dominance in open-oceans and littoral environments.  
Technical innovations offer capabilities superior to the existing MIW 
systems but developmental barriers and the lack of an overarching systems  
 
 xx
architecture will hinder these systems from being effectively integrated.  The 
focus of thesis is to identify an efficient and effective approach to infuse new 
technical advances and future systems into tomorrow’s MIW CONOPS.    
Findings of this thesis highlight a proposed architectural framework that 
key stakeholders can implement as a tool to guide the development of 
tomorrow’s MIW system-of-systems.  Under this proposed architectural 
framework as well as adherence to principles of Modular Open Systems 
Architecture (MOSA), achieving a capability based MIW system-of-systems is 
both traceable with systems engineering principles and aligned with tomorrow’s 
war fighting vision.  This thesis also finds inconsistencies with the threat sea 
mines bring versus the capabilities that MCM systems provide to the warfighter.  
Many of these inconsistencies can be attributed to a lack of commitment by the 
DoD in achieving a solution that meets this threat.  This lack of commitment has 
led to crucial capability gaps in MCM such as limitations in assured access 
through the very shallow MCM environment and an integrated MCM capability to 
the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups.  In addition to the proposed 
architectural framework, a traceability matrix was developed to aligning the 
proposed MOSA MIW architecture with mission based scenarios and 
requirements.  Finally, this thesis characterizes meeting tomorrow’s threat 
through the following: 
• Development of an overall MIW capabilities architect  
• Adherence to established requirements 
• Developing a cultural that supports an MIW architecture 
• Implementing spiral development concepts to get capability to fleet 
sooner  
• Develop a technology to counter buried mines 
• Do not phase out legacy capabilities based on un-proven 
capabilities 
• Validate system development against a traceability matrix 
• Remedy important equipment shortfalls on current dedicated 




Since World War II, fourteen United States Navy ships have been 
damaged or sunk by sea mines.1  Since 1950 to the present, there has been no 
other threat that has influenced the ability to maneuver in the open-oceans and   
littoral environments as much as the threat of sea mines.  The post-Cold War 
Navy has been reluctant to commit to the advent of advanced weapons, tactics 
or an integrated communications infrastructure to support mine warfare 
operations.  Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Navy has shifted its 
focus from open-ocean and global warfare to regional and asymmetrical threats.  
This shift in doctrine requires a new approach to combating the mine threat.   
The sea mine is an efficient force multiplier that is one of the most cost-
effective weapons in the naval arsenal.  Mines are small, easy to conceal, cheap 
to acquire, require virtually no maintenance, and can be easily laid from almost 
any type of platform.  Sea mines can be used to deny hostile forces access to the 
coastal zone and to defend important targets, such as ports, anchorages, and 
offshore structures, from amphibious or seaborne attack.  Mines can quickly 
nullify, or impair, the effectiveness of naval forces.  For their cost, mines present 
a disproportionate amount of effort to counter.  Because of this factor, mines are 
one of the most effective and deadly weapons that a naval force can employ.  
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number 
of mine producing countries.  Many of these producers are manufacturing mines 
of higher capability thus requiring a parallel increase in the technology for 
countering these mines.  Despite the rapid trend toward more sophisticated 
mines, development efforts for countermine systems have been plagued with  
 
                                            
1 J. Avery, (1998). The Naval Mine Threat to U.S. Surface Forces, Surface Warfare, May-
June, 4-9. 
 2
programmatic, developmental, cultural and integration hurdles that have the 
potential of derailing efforts to achieve a countermining program capable of 
keeping pace with and countering the threat of sea mines.  
The Navy must be prepared to counter technologically advanced mines as 
well as their low-tech predecessors.  The success of simple World War I and 
World War II vintage mines means that these weapons will undoubtedly continue 
to threaten U.S. Naval Forces.2 
The mine threat presents a tangible challenge for tomorrow’s war fighting 
vision.  Sea Power 21 is the Navy's vision to counter the risks of traditional and 
emerging dangers and threats.  It introduces three new operational concepts to 
accomplish the Navy's missions of sea control, power projection, strategic 
deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward presence.  The first of these three pillars 
is Sea Strike, which projects precise and persistent offensive power.  Sea Shield, 
the second pillar, provides global defensive assurance for the joint force and U.S. 
allies.  Finally, Sea Basing provides operational independence and support for 
the joint force.  These pillars of operational concepts will be enabled by an 
overarching communication structure identified as FORCEnet.  FORCEnet is an 
effort to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, 
and weapons into a seamlessly integrated combat force.3  
Naval Expeditionary Warfare consists of military operations mounted from 
the sea, usually on short notice. These operations are carried out by forward 
deployed or rapidly deployable, self-sustaining naval forces tailored to achieve a 
clearly stated objective.  Expeditionary Warfare is a key tenant to the Navy’s goal 
of power projection.  To effectively achieve this objective, Expeditionary Warfare 
must be agile, responsive, flexible and versatile.  When conducting operations 
                                            
2 Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, (2000).  Oceanography and 
Mine Warfare.  (0-309-51587-4) Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
3 John Young, ADM Joseph Sestak, ADM Lewis Crenshaw, LTGEN Mattis, LTGEN Robert 
Magnus, et al (2005, March 10). Projection Force Subcommittee on FY 2005 Navy Ship 




from the sea in littoral environments, mine warfare is an enabling mission area 
that facilitates an agile, flexible and versatile response.  Therein lies the 
disconnect between the Navy’s goals and its current capability.  Today’s mine 
warfare capabilities are neither agile nor responsive enough to keep pace with 
the proliferation of newer, more lethal sea mines.  There are numerous 
innovative programs designed to achieve a more versatile and responsive mine 
countermeasures capability.  Although these programs promise to bolster the 
Navy’s mine countermeasures capability, all of these emerging programs have 
been hindered by developmental barriers that threaten to prevent them from 
being integrated into tomorrow’s war fighting vision.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to capture the risks associated with 
transitioning from legacy mine warfare systems and their operations, and to 
determine how the development of emerging technology improvements will affect 
the capabilities of conducting mine countermeasures operations.  There are 
numerous business best practices and engineering disciplines that can be 
aligned to capture an efficient method to field newly identified technical 
innovations.   
All Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs should address 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) early in their program and acquisition 
planning.  Ultimately all new programs should discuss MOSA implementation in 
the context of their overall Acquisition Strategy and to the extent feasible in the 
Technology Development Strategy.4     
Specifically, this study will focus on developing a systems architectural 
model that incorporates various systems architectural principles including 
modularity, key interfaces, requirements traceability and form and function, which 
                                            
4 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) Memo 
Amplifying DoDD 5000.1 Guidance Regarding Modular Open Systems Approach Implementation, 
from www.acq.osd.mil/ats/opensyst.htm, 14 January 2005. 
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may serve as a template that will assure an effective design process to minimize 
capability gaps as the U.S. Navy transitions these innovative technologies to 
meet tomorrow’s mine warfare CONOPS through the Future Year Defense Plan 
(FYDP) and beyond. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will compare and contrast today’s legacy sensors, tactics 
and communications capability with tomorrow’s mine warfare vision.  This 
comparison will identify systematic steps necessary to align operational concepts 
with technical innovations bracketed under an architectural framework required to 
meet future requirements.  This thesis will explore the following questions:     
• What technology improvements have the potential to affect the 
architecture?  
• What is the DoD current plan for fielding systems through the 
FYDP? 
• What proposed benefit will these systems bring to the mine warfare 
Commander?  
• How can systems architecture reduce the risks of mine warfare 
operations?  
• How does today’s CONOPS support future design of new systems?   
• How does preplanned product improvement (P3I) influence 
CONOPS?   
• How will these proposed systems influence the decision making 
process? 
• What are the most significant technical advantages of these 
systems? 
• What is the best approach to transition these proposed capabilities 
to the warfighter?  
• What are the major developmental barriers?  
• What can be done to maximize the benefits of new developmental 
systems? 
• What is the best approach to integrate these systems into the Sea 
Power 21 framework? 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The intent of this thesis is to identify the requirements established by the 
Open Systems Joint Task Force and compare the initiative taken by the 
Expeditionary Warfare resource sponsor, Systems Commands and the warfighter 
to ensure the successful transition of new technologies into the existing force 
structure.  In addition this study will compare the processes currently planned for 
integrating emerging technologies into the tomorrow’s CONOPS.   
Specifically, the study will look at emerging developmental systems: the 
AN/AQS-20A mine hunting sonar, AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection 
System (ALMDS), AN/SQQ-232 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), 
AN/AWS-2 Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), AN/ALQ-220 
Organic Airborne and Surface Sweep System (OASIS), the MH-60S Multi-
Mission Helicopter, the Remote Mine Hunting System (RMS), the Mission 
Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV) and finally the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS).  These systems have over time been subjected to 
programmatic and developmental changes due to the lack of a well defined 
overarching systems architectural structure.   
Currently there are multiple individual developmental strategies for each of 
the respective systems with no specific strategy that ties all of these systems 
together as a system-of-systems.  The current acquisition process approach to a 
successful solution for tomorrow’s needs is at best ad hoc.  This study will take a 
broad look across current DoD best practices and systems engineering 
disciplines and align them under one cohesive model that best meets the 
requirements to field these individual systems under one system-of-systems 
model that will be seamlessly integrated under one framework to meet 
tomorrow’s war fighting doctrine.  A comparison of best DoD and commercial 
business practices, trade studies, and process management will be identified and 
merged to provide the best solution for the acquisition community to use as a 
template for success.   
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E. SCOPE 
This thesis was created to highlight the development efforts currently 
underway to enhance the capabilities of mine countermeasures.  The reader will 
be exposed to the various methods that influence the acquisition as well as the 
design and development processes of these individual systems.  The ultimate 
goal of this research is to capture the best methods known to both the defense 
and the commercial sector with respect to the design and fielding of a system-of-
systems under a unified architectural framework.  There are four main segments 
to this research:  
• Chapter I introduces the research topic and provides an overview of 
the current structure of mine warfare as well as the direction that 
the Navy is heading with respect to weapon systems development 
and the complex tactics required to meet tomorrow’s war fighting 
capability.  
• Chapter II introduces the reader to a brief history of MIW, and then 
compares the acquisition process underway by the Navy’s Systems 
Commands with requirements established by Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operation (OPNAV) Expeditionary Warfare’s (N85) and 
ensures their alignment.  Risk management measures will be 
reviewed as the Navy prepares to transition from legacy MIW 
systems to tomorrow’s next generation system-of-systems.  These 
new technology enhancements will be highlighted and contrasted 
with legacy systems as well as aligning MIW war fighting 
requirements. In addition the reader will be exposed to MOSA 
principles and how establishing a modular design affects program 
development and design.   
• Chapter III will review MOSA, emphasizing modular design 
principles of systems architecture.  From that, a notional 
architectural framework and traceability matrix will be developed to 
illustrate a link between tomorrow’s next generation countermining 
capabilities to threats in varying mission environments.  This 
notional architectural framework can serve as a template for the 
acquisition community to implement as a roadmap for future 
system-of-systems design.  
• Chapter IV summarizes this research by reviewing MIW’s history, 
the DoD’s transformation plan and the best processes for providing 
an integrated architectural framework to meet tomorrow’s MIW 
vision.  Also, a review of emerging technologies, budgetary 
constrains, war fighting requirements and cultural influences, their 
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effects on the acquisition process and ultimately fielding of new 
MIW systems will be discussed.  
F. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will examine documents covering best business practices for 
product development from the commercial industry as well as from the DoD with 
particular emphasis on systems architecture.  Information gathered for the 
development of this thesis will be ascertained from data gathering from the World 
Wide Web, DoD and commercial product symposiums, past and present mine 
warfare product development strategies, interviews with key stakeholders in the 
DoD acquisition community and reports from program management offices.   
G. MINE WARFARE CONCEPT OF OPERATION 
Mine Warfare is a mission area that encompasses a wide array of assets 
and embodies efforts to assure access through the open-oceans and to protect 
our forces in the littoral battlespace.  To that end an effective mine 
countermeasures doctrine should include an extensive infrastructure that is agile 
enough to maneuver with, and integrate seamlessly into tomorrow’s joint war 
fighting vision.   
Legacy MIW CONOPS focuses its effort on a pre-Cold War environment 
and employs five specific objectives; exploratory, reconnaissance, breakthrough, 
attrition and clearance operations.  These objectives are accomplished by the 
combined efforts of air, surface and subsurface MIW assets.  Exploratory 
operation determines whether or not mines are present.  This is usually the first 
objective when an enemy minefield is suspected.  If mines are found, the 
operation usually transitions to a reconnaissance objective.  Reconnaissance 
operations are designed to make a rapid assessment of the limits of a mined 
area, the estimated number and types of mines present.  The breakthrough 
objective is directed when a rapid operation is required to open channels and 
staging areas for an amphibious operation or break-in and or break-out of a port.  
This objective would be selected when there is insufficient time or forces for high 
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percentage clearance operations.  Attrition operations call for continuous or 
frequent mine countermeasures (MCM) efforts to keep the threat of mines to ship 
traffic as low as possible when traffic must continue to transit the mined waters 
for a comparatively long period of time.  Attrition is employed when mines cannot 
be quickly cleared because of factors such as enemy minefield replenishment or 
use of mines with arming delay or high ship counter settings.  Clearance is the 
objective of removing all the mine threat from the assigned area.  Because it is 
difficult to ensure that all mines are cleared, a percentage goal is assigned for 
mine removal to permit the MCM Commander to measure and report progress.5  
The post-Cold War era has ushered in a new era of proliferation of 
inexpensive mines that have the potential for deterring U.S. Naval plans from 
assured access to the open-oceans and the world’s littoral’s.  The open-oceans 
strategies of mine clearance of yesterday have expanded to include the current 
strategic concept of littoral access operations. (Refer to Figure 1 The Littoral 
Challenge).  To that end, our naval forces must have an effective mine 
countermeasures forces to ensure the execution of operations in today’s post-
Cold War era. 
The U.S. Navy must be prepared to operate in distant waters in the early 
stages of regional hostilities to enable the flow of land-based air and ground 
forces into the theater of operations, as well as to protect vital follow-on sealift 
required for delivery of heavy equipment and sustainment of major forces.6 
 
                                            
5 Joint Pub 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles and Mine Warfare, 24 February 1999 
p. IV 12-14.  
6 John Dalton, ADM Jeremy Boorda, Gen Carl Mundy (1994), Forward…From the Sea, 
Navy/Marine Corps Strategy Statement. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy. 
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Figure 1.   The Littoral Challenge7 
 
For the foreseeable future, we must anticipate increases in lethality of 
mines, their complexity of design and the number of mines available for use by 
practically any adversary.  Modern mine countermeasures tactics and weapon 
systems are pivotal if U.S. Naval Forces are to maintain a credible forward 
presence to ensure battlespace dominance and to conduct power projection 
operations.   
The development of these capabilities must be guided by a well-conceived 
concept of operations.  This concept of operations will be used to conduct and 
guide the development of doctrine, operations, tactics, and systems needed to 
defeat these dynamic naval threats.  Naval mine countermeasures are unique to 
                                            
7 Navy Warfare Development Command (2003, February). Littoral Combat Ship Concept of 
Operations Version 3.1[Graphic Image], Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.   
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the maritime littoral operating environment.  It is a singular naval responsibility 
and now a core naval competency that directly affects the littoral joint force 
scheme of maneuver.  The Mine Warfare Commander's (MIWC) primary 
responsibility will be to effectively fight the mine warfare battle.  The MIWC will do 
so by adopting a layered defense concept that spans strategic, operational, and 
tactical war fighting levels.  
H. SUMMARY 
The U.S. Navy has had a long history of failing to provide for an adequate 
capability in naval MCM.  History is full of examples from as far back as the Civil 
War where sea mines served as a force multiplier.  Mines have decisively altered 
the outcomes of naval engagements in every war starting with the Russo-
Japanese War.  Nevertheless, the lessons learned by European navies have 
proven to be strikingly different from those learned by the U.S. Navy.   
Most recently, Desert Storm displayed the devastating effects and 
mission-altering implications naval mines pose to the naval commander.  Desert 
Storm provided the U.S. with the shocking effect that a couple of cheap and 
primitive mines could have on the entire Fleet from a psychological standpoint as 
well as a strategic-operational standpoint.  The raid on Faylaka Island, and 
subsequent amphibious assault to Kuwait, were eventually cancelled by U.S. 
Navy’s Central Command because the risk of mines was considered too high.  
On February 19, 1991 a $1500 contact mine of the World War I vintage blew a 
16-by-25 foot hole in the USS Tripoli’s hull, and an Italian-made influence mine 
almost sank the USS Princeton. 8 
Since the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Congress has paid particular 
attention to the efforts placed on mine warfare and has concluded after an 
extensive Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in 1998 that the U.S. 
Navy had not established clear priorities among its MIW research and 
development programs to sustain the development and procurement of the most 
                                            
8 Don Ward (1993 June 28), Mine Boggling, Navy Times, No. 38, 28, p. 14. 
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needed systems.  Consequently, the Navy experienced delays in delivering new 
systems to provide necessary capabilities.  Establishment of a long-range plan 
must be developed to identify gaps and limitations in the Navy's MCM capabilities 
and establish priorities.  The DoD states the process was ongoing and consisted 
of developing an overall concept of MCM operations and an architecture within 
which needs and shortfalls in capabilities could be evaluated and prioritized.9   
Without question mine warfare is a multi-faceted war fighting discipline 
that requires a great deal of effort to counter a fairly simple, but extremely 
effective weapon.  History has revealed that the sea mine’s lethality, ease of 
acquisition and simplicity to employ, makes it the weapon of choice for super 
powers, allied as well as rogue nations.  It isn’t a matter of if, but when terrorist 
groups will employ the use of sea mine as a weapon to force their fundamentalist 
demands on unsuspecting nations.    
As the world’s greatest naval force, the U.S. Navy will have to take stock 
of its existing MIW capabilities, refocus its research and development efforts and 
shape the aforementioned technologies into a formidable capability that assures 
the U.S. an ability to counter any sea mine threat anytime and anywhere.  There 
are a number of programs on the horizon that when aligned will yield a MIW 
capability second to none.  This study will highlight those programs; along with 
best business practices both adopted by the DoD and the commercial sector.  It 
will take commitment by all key stakeholders to ensure its success as the Navy 





                                            
9 GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military 
Research and Development, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives June 








































II. ILLUSTRATING THE DYNAMICS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
“The idea of design─of making something that has not existed before─is 
central to engineering.”10  A projected architectural end state for any program, 
structure, community, system, or system-of-systems can evolve over time, or can 
be explicitly designed and adhered to from the project’s inception.  Mine 
countermeasures includes elements of both evolutionary design as well as 
designs that are explicit.  Although much of MIW architectural design has been 
influenced by evolution, explicit MIW architectural design was first seen with such 
developments as the Admirable class minesweeper and Airborne Mine 
Countermeasures (AMCM).  The Admirable class ships built during the 1940’s 
were the first attempt to refine the requirements by the U.S. Navy to combat the 
threat of sea mines, while the use of helicopters during the Vietnam conflict to 
conduct mine sweeping from an altitude that provided safety and the tactical 
advantage of speed.  These two innovations were implemented as explicit 
systems to improve the capabilities of mine countermeasures.  Over the following 
fifty years, the architectural design of MIW continued to be influenced by explicit 
as well as evolutionary design.    
B. HISTORY OF MINE WARFARE 
The Battle of Mobile Bay during the Civil War stemmed the initial need to 
counter the threat of sea mines which was forever etched in U.S. Naval history 
by Admiral Farragut’s quote, “Damn the torpedoes” referencing the destructive 
effect by the first generation of sea mines.  Followed some forty-years later 
during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, where uncontrolled Russian mining of 
Tsushima Straits resulted in the sinking of massive quantities of neutral shipping. 
This uncontrolled mining ultimately led to the first Hague convention where 
                                            
10 Henry Petroski (1992). To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design, 
Preface, Vintage Books, New York. 
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worldwide attention was paid to mining.  Inspired by the principle of the freedom 
of sea routes and the common highway of all nations, an international accord 
was subsequently enacted as a result of observing the conflict of World War I.  
The Hague Conference was convened in 1907 as the first attempt to negotiate 
viable restrictions upon the employment of mine warfare by belligerent nations.  
Essentially, four basic points were agreed upon: it was forbidden to lay drifting 
mines unless “they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most 
after those who have laid them have lost control over them,” it was forbidden to 
lay “automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they 
have broken loose from their moorings,” it was forbidden to lay automatic contact 
mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole purpose of intercepting 
commercial navigation; and every possible precaution must be used to ensure 
safe navigation to non-belligerent’s when moored minefields are employed.  
These agreements were largely unenforceable and (from a military standpoint) 
essentially impractical if mining was to offer any tactical or strategic advantage as 
borne out by the actions of the belligerents during World War I when they were 
largely ignored.  The Hague agreements were scheduled for renewal in 1914, but 
the war prevented it, consequently the stipulations of the original 1907 Hague 
Convention were never updated or amended.  It remains, for all practical 
purposes, the basic international agreement on mine warfare in force today.11  
The naval mine emerged as the allies’ primary and most effective weapon 
against the German submarine during World War I.  American and British 
minelayers planted over 72,000 mines in the North Sea over a five month period 
from Scotland to Norway.  This mine barrage sank six submarines, damaged 
many more, and forced U-boat commanders to either face destruction or waste 
precious time and fuel evading the barrage.12   
                                            
11 Sam Tangredi (2004). Globalization and Maritime Power: Low Tech Warfare in a High tech 
World, Institute for National Security Strategic Studies, National Defense University: University 
Press of the Pacific.  
12 E. B. Potter (1981). Sea Power: A Naval History, U.S. Naval Institute Press. 
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In the years of peace that followed World War I, the sea mine was all but 
forgotten.  However, with the start of World War II, mine development was 
revived.  The airplane and submarine were introduced as minelayers and a new 
series of mines were designed.   These mines employed electronic detectors 
which responded to, or were actuated by magnetic, acoustic, or pressure 
changes resulting from a ship entering the mine’s sensor range.  The extensive 
use of mines armed with new electronic detection systems, ship-counters and 
arming-delay devices placed an immense burden on the mine countermeasures 
forces.  
The advent of new mine technology ushered in the introduction of 
specified mine countermeasures systems and mine threat self protection 
measures.  A direct and explicit means to counter the sea mine threat led to the 
development of the Admirable class fleet mine sweeper, where two prototype 
vessels were produced in 1942.  As conflict escalated, a number of companies 
increased their production efforts to supply the U.S. Navy as well as some allied 
forces with this newly designed minesweeper.  Incredibly nine companies would 
launch 120 Admirable class minesweepers between October 1942 and the end 
of World War II.  With the war over and post war minesweeping completed, most 
of the Admirable minesweepers were decommissioned and placed in the U.S. 
Navy’s reserve fleets.  A few would remain in commission and would serve as 
training vessels for a number of years to come.13   
At the beginning of the Korean War, seven Admirable class minesweepers 
were brought back into service to aid the Fleet against the sea mine threat as the 
U.S. redefined its MCM capability with the creation of two specific classes of MIW 
ships to counter the mining threat in different environments.  The ocean going 
minesweeper (MSO) and the coastal minesweeper (MSC) class ships were 
                                            
13 Robert Briggen (1999).How The Admirable’s Fit Into World War II and After. Retrieved May 
8, 2005 from https: http://members.aol.com/turkit/page14.html.  
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developed to counter sea mines in the open-oceans as well as coastal zones.  
Many of the weapon systems developed during this period are still in use today.14   
The Vietnam conflict ushered yet another MCM capability.  The 
introduction of AMCM added another dimension to the battle against the sea 
mining threat as helicopters were introduced as an airborne MCM capability.  
AMCM assets are unique in their capability to deploy rapidly, provide rapid 
reconnaissance and precursor MCM operations as well as being safer and more 
capable than surface mine countermeasures (SMCM) assets against the shallow 
water mine threat.  On January 27th, 1973 Task Force 78 was formed to conduct 
minesweeping operations in North Vietnamese waters under the name Operation 
Endsweep.  By February 6th, 1973 surface minesweepers of Task Force 78 
began preliminary sweeping to prepare an anchorage in deep water off the 
approaches to Haiphong Harbor.  This was a first in mine warfare as airborne 
minesweeping had never been done with live mines.15  
From the Vietnamese harbors to the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, the 
role of MIW continued to be further defined.  As this warfare discipline evolved 
over time the introduction of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units added 
identification, neutralization and provided the Navy's only very shallow water 
zone mine countermeasure capability to mine warfare.   
The effect of mining had a significant impact on the Persian Gulf region for 
several decades.  During October 1973, the end of the Arab-Israeli war exploited 
the capabilities of EOD teams.  For a six-year period, the Suez Canal between 
Egypt and the Israeli occupied territory in the Suez region had been closed 
during the conflict.  Under the agreement that ended the war, an international 
force would clear the canal of 8,500 pieces of wreckage, unexploded ordnance, 
and mines.  The Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean 
                                            
14 Bill Marks (1998). Mine Warfare MCM Introduction: The Threat. Retrieved May 10, 2005 
from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/swos/cmd/miw/Sp6-4-1/sld001.htm. 
15 Naval Historical Center, Operation Pocket Money and Operation Endsweep, Retrieved May 
10, 2005 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pocket_money.htm, May 11, 2006. 
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established Task Force 65, the MCM Force responsible to Sixth Fleet to handle 
the U.S. contribution to the clearance efforts of the Suez Canal.  Admiral Brian 
McCauley, who was the Commander of the MIW Forces, led the U.S. Forces that 
swept North Vietnam's harbors at the end of the Vietnam War and was assigned 
command of U.S. and international MCM forces.  Despite the fact that there was 
little intelligence on mines that might be in Suez waters, planning for the 
operation moved ahead swiftly.  The U.S. Navy deployed an AMCM squadron, 
HM-12 along with the Mobile Mine Countermeasures Command (MOMCOM) to 
conduct MCM operations.  This force operated from the amphibious assault ships 
USS IWO JIMA and USS INCHON.  Working expeditiously, the helicopters swept 
120 square miles of canal.16 
 
Figure 2.   SMCM and AMCM MCM Operations, Persian Gulf, 198717 
                                            
16 Tamara Melia  (1991) Damn the Torpedoes, A short history of U.S. Mine 
Countermeasures, 1777-1991 Washington: D.C. Naval Historical Center.  
17 Michael Palmer (1992). Guardians of the Gulf. [Photograph], Free Press, New York.  
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Following operations in the Suez, the 1980s and 1990s revealed further 
emphasis for the need to focus on the enabling aspects of maritime mine 
warfare, which time and again throughout history has been proven to be a show 
stopper, but has received an inadequate amount of financial support, especially 
during the Cold War years.  In the 1980s there was the experience of Operation 
ERNEST WILL, commonly known as the “Tanker War” and in the early 1990s 
there were DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM which saw effective hunting 
and sweeping against more than 1300 sea mines laid in the Persian Gulf, which 
included both WWII era as well as modern more sophisticated influence mines.  
It was during DESERT STORM that both the USS Princeton and USS Tripoli 
were damaged by Manta and LUGM-145 mines respectively.  The combined 
damage to both ships totaled $21.6 million, where the estimated cost for one 
mine was $10,000 and $1,500 for the other, illustrating the disproportionate cost 
of damage to threat relationship.18   
The structure of the U.S. Navy's Mine Force has evolved throughout 
history in an attempt to keep stride with the development of sea mines.  The 
threat posed by these weapons continues and is increasing in today's world of 
inexpensive advanced electronics and multiple potential enemies.  During the 
Cold War, U.S. Naval Forces concentrated on guarding against the sophisticated 
Soviet blue-water, air, and undersea threats.  Yet since World War II, U.S. Naval 
Forces have suffered significantly more physical damage and operational 
interference from sea mines than from air, missile, and submarine attacks.  The 
need for U.S. Naval Forces to maneuver and project power in the world's littorals 
is also increasing.  Yet the U.S. is not now likely to be able to adequately handle 
the near-term threat of mines.  Looking ahead, the Navy's planned mine warfare 
                                            
18 Commander Mine Warfare Command (2002). Mine Warfare History: Concept of Operations 
Retrieved May 15, 2006 from https://www.cmwc.navy.mil/COMOMAG/Mine%20 
History/Vision%20Statement.aspx. 
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improvement programs have major shortcomings that need to be addressed now 
if current risks are to be reduced rather than permitted to continue to grow.19 
C. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Existing MCM operations are conducted to clear enemy minefields to a 
specified objective, which takes into account an established risk level to shape 
the battlespace and to project power from the sea.  Legacy airborne, surface and 
EOD MCM forces are used to conduct dedicated mine countermeasure 
operations.  The strength of today’s dedicated forces lies with their ability to 
conduct sustained MCM operations in large areas over extended periods of time.  
Their key limitation is the length of time it takes to reposition the surface 
contingent of the triad from continental U.S. homeports to a theater of operation 
in time of conflict.  A small number of ships are forward deployed to mitigate this 
deficiency; however, the requirement remains for the Navy to have a more robust 
capability available globally on short notice.20  
1. Legacy Concept of Operations 
When naval forces must operate in mined waters, dedicated mine 
countermeasure operations are used to reduce the threat of mines to an 
acceptable level to permit operations through sea lines of communication and 
within amphibious and naval operating areas.  Legacy MCM tactics are 
determined by the time and assets available.  The time required to move MCM 
units to the minefield area as opposed to the time available for completion of 
MCM operations is a key determination.  A primary mission of AMCM forces is to 
provide short-notice, rapid response to any mining threat.  AMCM currently 
operates under a 72-hour ready-to-deploy requirement.  AMCM assets can self 
                                            
19 Commission on Physical Science, Mathematics, and Applications (2001). Naval Mine 
Warfare: Operational and Tactical Challenge for Naval Forces (0-309-07578-5), Washington, 
D.C. National Academy Press.  
20 Mine Warfare Sub-committee, Expeditionary Warfare Committee, National Defense 
Industry Association, (2000) NDIA N-85 MSC Study Final Report, Washington, D.C.; Government 
Printing Office.  
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lift, provided they are in close proximity to the area of operation.  If not they must 
be airlifted by C-5 Galaxy aircraft, or transported by a surface vessel.  When 
conducting operations, AMCM forces sacrifice some degree of effectiveness and 
stamina to maximize response capability.  SMCM forces are more effective but, 
because of their relatively slow transit speeds, have a long response times.  For 
long distances, heavy lift ships can transport SMCM units to the area of 
operations more quickly than the MCM ships could transit on their own.  
Whenever time and circumstances permit, AMCM assets should be used for 
precursory minefield sweeping before operating SMCM assets.  This provides a 
greater safety margins for surface craft, which lack the helicopter’s relative 
immunity to mines.  EOD diver systems and marine mammal systems conduct 
identification, neutralization and very shallow water MCM operations after the 
mine threat is localized by either AMCM or SMCM forces.  EOD teams constitute 
the only means for hunting and clearing mines from shallow inshore waters.21  
2. Alignment of Systems Requirement  
The capabilities of MCM have improved over the decades to meet the 
threat of sea mines, but although capable of countering this threat, by its very 
nature MCM has evolved as a result of new mine developments and changing 
threat environment.  Notwithstanding the capabilities of today’s MIW forces, the 
logic behind the evolution of MCM has been flawed.22  This logic has provided 
the U.S. Navy with a warfare discipline that is slow to engage, cumbersome to 
operate and is not integrated within the strike group.      
Conducting MIW operations in the Cold War environment enabled an 
effective solution to the mining threat of that era.  As the DoD embraces post-
Cold War doctrine highlighted in literature such as “Forward…From The Sea” 
and its predecessor “…From the Sea,” fighting the unknown enemy in an 
                                            
21 Joint Staff, (1999) Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles and Mine Warfare Joint Pub 3-15, 
Countering Enemy Employment.  
22 Tamara Melia (1991) Damn the Torpedoes, A short history of U.S. Mine Countermeasures, 
1777-1991 Washington: D.C. Naval Historical Center. 
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asymmetric environment places tremendous burden on the CONOPS of legacy 
MIW.  This new shift in warfare doctrine has caused a shift in the DoD’s focus to 
align its capabilities with a new agile way of fighting the enemy.    
The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has lectured in various 
forums as well as communicated with the American public, Congress and our 
senior military leaders in the direction of change, or transformation for the DoD.  
Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military 
competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, 
people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protects 
against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which 
helps underpin peace and stability in the world. 
Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and 
develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly 
to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to 
adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are 
the defining characteristics of our new security environment. During 
the Cold War, we faced a fairly predictable set of threats. We came 
to know a great deal about our adversary, because it was the same 
one for a long period. We knew many of the capabilities they 
possessed, and we fashioned strategies and capabilities that we 
believed we needed to deter them. And they were successful. It 
worked.23 
Enemy mines and obstacles pose perhaps the most significant challenge 
to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps ability to project full dimension naval power 
from the stern gate, over water, across the beach, and to objectives ashore. 
Legacy naval MIW forces, although highly capable, require significant time to 
move to theater, and require unique support not found elsewhere in the naval 
expeditionary force.  At the same time, the adequacy of legacy MIW capabilities 
is deteriorating with the proliferation of new technologies and weapons.  The 
transformation of naval mine warfare is centered upon the transition from a 
specialized MIW force to an agile, scalable capability that is not tied to dedicated 
                                            
23 Donald Rumsfeld (2002, January 31). [Address]. Address presented at the National 
Defense University.  Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. [Transcript]. Retrieved May 23, 2006 from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html. 
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platforms, with the ultimate goal of removing the man from the minefield by the 
use of unmanned vehicles. Naval efforts in offensive, defensive, and assault-
breaching MIW will address the challenges of restricted capabilities and 
proliferating threats by moving to a range of solutions which are more flexible, 
more effective and more rapidly employable.  A significant body of analysis has 
verified that simple avoidance will not be an option in many key areas of national 
interest.  In these areas the current “Detect and avoid when possible, breach 
when necessary” approach must be taken.  The transformational naval approach 
to MIW is based on a CONOPS that integrates a range of new technologies that 
will enable future naval forces to freely operate and maneuver in the littorals, and 
deliver ground forces throughout the beach regions.24  
To meet future MIW requirements, the Navy has developed and funded a 
plan to provide the MCM Commander with capabilities organic to Carrier and 
Expeditionary Strike groups.  These new capabilities were initially planned for a 
2005 fleet deliver, but have shifted due to programmatic delays.  The suite of 
next generation MCM systems have subsequently been rescheduled for fielding 
in 2007.  This next generation MCM capability ranges from airborne sensors and 
neutralizers designed for use aboard the MH-60S helicopter, to a sensor capable 
of being employed by the MH-60S as well as the Remote Minehunting System 
(RMS).  In addition to these sensors and search platforms, the Navy is investing 
in the capability of a Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
(MRUUV), an autonomous system which will be designed to be launched and 
recovered from U.S. Navy submarines to search, locate and classify mine-like 
objects in suspected mine danger areas as well as other clandestine operations.  
Linking these elements together under an umbrella of data fusion and transfer is 
the Mine Warfare Environmental Decision Aid Library (MEDAL).       
                                            
24 Gordon England, ADM Vern Clark, GEN Michael Hagee (2003) Assured Access and 
Projection of Power…From the Sea: Naval Transformation Road Map 2003. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Navy. 
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3. Risk Management  
While the Navy plans the acquisition strategies for transitioning the MIW 
forces to meet the requirements of tomorrow’s war fighting vision, a concerted 
effort must be made to ensure that support for legacy MIW capabilities remain 
intact.  In an attempt to mitigate gaps in the Navy’s MCM capability the 
Expeditionary Warfare Committee, commissioned by OPNAV N85, examined the 
risks associated with transitioning the MIW forces to meet tomorrows MIW 
CONOPS.  The conclusion of the study highlighted the need to maintain an 
effective MCM capability while the Navy transitions to an organic MCM force 
structure.  In the end, a mix of legacy and organic surface and airborne forces is 
envisioned to satisfy the required roles and missions over the wide spectrum of 
threats and scenarios in an uncertain future.  It is the opinion of the National 
Defense Industry Association study group that prematurely implementing the 
transition plan based on yet to be demonstrated capabilities would have a high 
degree of risk.25  
In the conduct of today’s MCM operations, Commander Mine Warfare 
Command (CMWC) employs two classes of MIW ships to conduct surface mine 
countermeasures; the MHC Avenger Class and the MCM Osprey Class MIW 
ships and utilizes the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter for AMCM operation.  Both 
SMCM and AMCM platforms are reaching the end of their service life while the 
proposed fielding plans for the newly designed MIW systems are planned for 
fleet introduction.  As with many newly developed systems, programmatic 
hurdles tend to affect fielding time lines, consequently both AMCM and SMCM 
acquisition programs have seen their share of delays.  The risks associated with 
this reduction in MCM forces may negatively impact tomorrows MIW capability.  
Currently the Navy plans to divest the Fleet’s inventory of all the MHC’s by FY-08  
 
                                            
25 Mine Warfare Subcommittee, Expeditionary Warfare Committee, National Defense Industry 




coincident with the introduction the Littoral Combat Ship, a new modular 
designed ship capable of conducting Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), Surface 




































Figure 3.   SMCM Platform Inventory Projections27   
 
The MH-53E Sea Dragon multi-mission helicopter, an MCM asset 
employed by CMWC as one of the three pillars to MCM, is primarily employed as 
an AMCM platform with the secondary mission of heavy lift logistics.  Produced in 
the early 1980’s, there are currently 31 helicopters in the Navy’s inventory.  The 
airframe is designed to operate in austere environments or from expeditionary 
                                            
26 Edward Miller (2006, May 10). Mine Warfare: Dedicated, Organic a way forward for MCM 
Operations.  Lecture provided to AMCM leadership during MH-53E community developed by  
OPNAV N-85 and PEO LMW, PMS 495.  Corpus Christi, TX. 
27 Jason Lopez (2006). Surface Mine Countermeasures [Chart]. From PMS 495 Mine Warfare 
Presentation (p. 7). Washington, D.C.: PEO LMW Washington Navy Yard.  
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surface vessels and other combatants at sea.  The MH-53E is a proven AMCM 
platform capable of towing a variety of MCM systems.   The aircraft’s was original 
designed with a service life that limited each airframe to 6900 hour of operating 
time.  The total average life on the fleet of helicopters is approximately 4100 
hours, with the first of the aircraft expected to reach the end of its service life in 
FY-07. 28   
 
Figure 4.   MH-53E Attrition With and Without the Fatigue Life Extension29  
 
Mitigation plans for both AMCM and SMCM are underway to minimize 
potential gaps with tomorrow’s next generation MIW capability as a consequence 
of decommissioning the MHC ships and the attrition of the MH-53E helicopter.  
Programmatic changes for SMCM include funding of the mid-life upgrade plan 
                                            
28 Jack Fulton (2006, March 22). H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter Lecture provided to the All 
Helicopter Operational Advisory Group developed by PMA 261, Patuxent River, MD.  
29 Jack Fulton (2006). Heavy Lift Helicopter [Chart]. From PMA 261. All Helicopter 
Operational Advisory Group Presentation (p 8) Patuxent River, MD. PMA 261 Naval Air Station 
PAX River.   
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that greatly enhances the performance of the MCM-1 Class ships.  Reduction of 
the MHC-51 Class ships enables investment in the critical technologies required 
for achievement of the MCM vision with a minimal reduction in capability and no 
reduction in response time considering operational requirements and timelines.  
Including an improved mine neutralizer; the Expendable Mine Neutralization 
System (EMNS). Additional upgrades will provide an improved capability which 
include the following: 
• Replacement of the Mine Neutralization System (AN/SLQ-48) with 
the EMNS  
• Modernization of acoustic sweep systems with the Advanced 
Acoustic Generator (AAG) and the Infrasonic Advanced Acoustic 
Generator (IAAG), replacement of current AN/SQQ-32 Sonar with a 
High Frequency Wide Band capability and communications suite 
modernization (HF only) 
• Isotta-Fraschini Engine Planned Product Improvement Program for 
5 remaining ships 
• Aft Deck Equipment upgrades will remove deteriorating and heavy 
hydraulic systems, replacing them with reliable electric motors 
reducing maintenance requirements and five tons of weight 
• Bow thruster Improvement program will replace the thrust vane 
monitor optic sensor, hydraulic actuators and accumulator with 
supportable units and adds a reduction gear hand pre-lube pump 
• Digital Voltage Regulator program will replace the existing outdated 
ships service electric Voltage regulator with a Digital Voltage 
Regulator 
• The 400 Hz Static Frequency Converter upgrade30 
Programmatic changes to AMCM force structure include a budget funded, 
$4.0M Fatigue Life Extension Program (FLEX) commencing in fiscal year 2007.  
The FLEX includes a structural enhancement prior to airframes reaching the 
6900 hours operating limitation to reinforce a critical flight station.  This 
improvement will extend the service life of the aircraft to 10,000 hours of use.  
The FLEX will cover 20 AMCM capable airframes to ensure operational plan 
                                            
30 Edward Miller, (personal communication, May 10, 2006). Topic of discussion was 
managing risks when divesting the Fleet of Coastal Mine Hunting Ships.  
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requirements can be met until next generation systems are fielded and mature.  
The FLEX will provide a sustained capability during transition to future MCM 
systems.31  In addition to extending the service life of the MH-53E, the Program 
Executive Office, Littoral Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) is also establishing the MH-
53E as a test and evaluation platform for verification and validation of the 
AN/AQS-20A mine hunting sonar, the Archerfish AMNS and the AN/ALQ-220 
OASIS.  This mitigation plan accomplishes two objectives.  The first is being to 
validate and verify testing requirements for each of these newly designed 
weapon systems while concurrent testing is being conducted on the Block II 
variant of the MH-60S.  Without this concurrent testing of both the MH-60S and 
the weapon systems, testing would have to be accomplished serially with the 
MH-60S taking precedence.  Conducting this testing serially would ultimately 
delay program maturity by extending the timeline for testing both the MH-60S 
and the weapon systems.  Secondly, while conducting testing of the weapon 
systems on the MH-53E, a proven integration plan would provide flexibility to 
enable these next generation systems to be deployed on both the MH-53E as 
well as the MH-60S.32   
4. Transition Requirements for MIW CONOPS 
Future MCM operations will utilize a network of next generation sensors 
and weapons that can be optimized for each threat, depth, and environmental 
regime.  Effective organic MCM operations will depend on a complementary 
"system-of-systems" approach to achieve success.  This requires pursuit of a 
rigorous investment strategy, leveraging commonality, modularity, and portability 
to develop and integrate a range of new technologies and systems. Organic 
MCM capabilities, along with a balanced supporting force of dedicated MCM 
assets will enable our deployed forces to maneuver while executing other combat 
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missions.  Transitioning the next generation MIW systems to tomorrow’s war 
fighting vision will have to follow the guidance of an architectural framework that 
will align these system-of-systems to tomorrow’s CONOPS.  In order to eliminate 
the delay of getting the dedicated forces to the fight, an Organic Mine 
Countermeasures (OMCM) CONOPS has been developed.  OMCM capabilities 
will decrease the response time required to commence the MCM campaign and 
expand the service's overall MCM capability.  It will integrate the next generation 
MCM sensors and weapons as part of the combat systems of ships, submarines, 
and helicopters embedded in the Carrier Strike and Expeditionary Strike 
Groups.33  
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be the organic platform that will be 
designed from the keel up to be a part of a netted and distributed force.  The key 
war fighting capability of LCS will be its off-board systems: manned helicopters 
and unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles.  Its modular design, built 
to MOSA architecture standards, provides flexibility and a means to rapidly 
reconfigure mission modules and payloads.  Approximately 40% of LCS’s 
payload volume will be reconfigurable.  As technology matures, the U.S. Navy 
will not have to buy a new LCS seaframe, but will upgrade the mission modules 
or the unmanned systems.  LCS will be different from any warship that has been 
built for the U.S. Navy.  The program provides the best balance of risk with 
affordability and speed of construction.34  
D. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS  
Integral to MOSA, the acquisition process is intended to be flexible and to 
accommodate systems and technologies of varying maturities. Systems 
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dependent on immature technologies will take longer to develop and produce, 
while those that employ mature technologies can proceed through the process 
relatively quickly.  Acquisition programs shall be managed through the 
application of a systems engineering approach that optimizes total system 
performance and minimizes total ownership costs.  A modular, open systems 
approach shall be employed, where feasible.  The Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics signed a memo that amplified and 
expanded the policy for implementation of MOSA.  This directive establishes that 
all programs subject to milestone review shall brief their program’s MOSA 
implementation status to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to determine 
compliance.  The Director of Defense Systems signed a memo that describes 
how the requirements stipulated in the memo should address systems-of-
systems requirements in the formal acquisition process.  Based on the 
instructions contained in the memo, all DoD acquisition programs should address 
MOSA early in their program and acquisition planning, and should discuss MOSA 
implementation in the context of their overall Acquisition Strategy and to the 
extent feasible in the Technology Development Strategy.35  
How does MOSA align with tomorrow’s next generation MIW CONOPS? 
To characterize the ideals of this directive, the Modular Open Systems Approach 
is both a business and technical strategy for developing a new system or 
modernizing an existing one.  It is a means to assess and implement, when 
feasible, widely supported commercial interface standards in developing systems 
using a modular design concepts.  MOSA is an enabler that supports program 
teams in the acquisition community to design for affordable change, employ 
evolutionary acquisition, spiral development and develop an integrated roadmap 
for weapon systems design and development.  Basing design strategies on 
widely supported open standards increases the chance that future changes will 
be able to be integrated in a cost effective manner.  Designing a system for 
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affordable change requires modularity.  An evolutionary acquisition strategy 
provides a foundation that meets existing needs while providing the capability to 
meet evolving requirements and threats.  An integrated roadmap is a tool for 
detailing the strategy to deliver weapon systems that is capable, upgradeable, 
affordable, and supportable throughout its planned life-cycle.36 
 
Figure 5.   The MOSA Framework37 
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The principles of MOSA align itself with the visions of a transformational 
DoD and provides the basic tenets necessary to achieve future capability while 
managing the risk of an evolving threat as well as changes in technology.   
Although MOSA provides a framework for managing systems development, it 
lacks a linkage to ensure the transition of today’s capabilities with tomorrow’s 
plan.  There are, however, tools within the MOSA framework that can be 
implemented to characterize risks associated with transitioning today’s MIW 
capabilities with tomorrow’s newly designed MIW system-of-systems.  To align 
the next generation organic MIW developmental systems with tomorrow’s war 
fighting concepts while simultaneously managing capability gaps, we must clearly 
understand tomorrow’s organic requirements and align them with today’s 
dedicated capabilities as well as capture these elements under the MOSA 
architectural construct.     
1. Aligning Future CONOPS and Capabilities 
Requirements are at the heart of all developmental programs.  
Tomorrow’s next generation system-of-systems is no exception.  Organic MCM 
systems are being developed to permit naval forces to operate and transit in a 
mined environment without having to await the arrival of dedicated MCM forces. 
Focusing primarily on the area that stretches from deep water to the 40-foot 
depth curve, organic assets will provide a highly capable, albeit reduced, 
capacity across the MCM requirements spectrum.  Specifically, the Carrier Strike 
Group Commander will have a full range of organic MCM capabilities embarked 
as an integral part of the strike group.  These shipborne assets will give forward 
deployed forces the ability to conduct timely MCM operations, allowing for 
unencumbered transit and minimizing the operational delay or impact of mines.38    
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At the outset it must be noted that there is no "silver bullet" in MCM.  The 
different types of threat mines and environmental conditions that will face our 
naval forces argue for a system-of-systems which is robust and flexible enough 
to operate in regimes from waters in excess of 200 feet in depth to the surf zone 
and craft landing zone on the beach.  Technology will not support single 
platforms or sensors to perform the MCM mission across the spectrum of 
threats.39 
The primary objective of near-term improvements of Navy MCM is to 
reduce the operational response and MCM tactical timelines.  The response 
timeline for current MCM forces is constrained by the speed of strategic lift or 
surface transit time from the continental United States (CONUS) or overseas 
stations to the area of conflict.  From CONUS, MCM command elements, AMCM 
forces, and MCM EOD forces can be airlifted to theater and become operational 
within 10 days.  However, SMCM forces must sail directly to theater or travel on 
specialized heavy-lift ships, requiring 30 to 60 days.  The Navy is forward-basing 
MCM assets in some potential conflict areas, specifically the Western Pacific and 
Arabian Gulf, significantly reducing the time required for SMCM forces to respond 
to joint commanders in charge of MCM requirements in two likely areas of 
confrontation.  However, overall response times remain too long for many likely 
contingencies.   
Organic MCM sensors are being developed to answer many of the unique 
challenges associated with MCM.  The threat of sea mines comes in many 
different forms.  Moored mines are by far the most common in the world's war 
stocks and any minefield encountered will probably contain mostly contact mines 
of varying types.  Contact mines are detonated when the ship strikes them.  
Bottom mines lie on the ocean floor at varying depths and can be detonated by 
an acoustic, magnetic, pressure or a combination of these influences.  Some 
moored mines can also be actuated by external influences.  To further 
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complicate the MCM challenge, mines can have selective time delay fuses. This 
lets the mine become active after a certain day and, if no targets have passed 
over it after a certain period; the mine enters a dormant stage, making it 
inoperative and will reactivate when a ship enters its sensor range again.  They 
also have similar multiple target ship count devices which allows a predetermined 
number of ships to pass before detonation.  Rising vertical mines (RVM) and 
anti-countermeasures dormancy capabilities in today’s most complex sea mines 
increase the complexity of countering the mine threat.  An RVM is a mine 
designed for use in either very deep water, which could not otherwise be mined, 
or where the seabed is soft and glutinous.  The rising mine lies on or under the 
sea floor.  It is normally equipped with a passive acoustic sensor to listen for a 
ship or submarine to pass within range.  When contact is made, it switches to an 
active mode and jettisons ballast to change its buoyancy from negative to 
positive.  This causes it to float up and explode at the appropriate moment.  
Counter countermeasures features enable a mine to render itself dormant when 
it senses it is being interrogated.  Finally, there are new materials used as mine 
casings such as plastics and fiberglass in addition to casings designed to 
camouflage these weapons to mimic rocks.40 
A significant shift of functional roles between dedicated and organic MCM 
will be the phasing out of the MH-53E helicopters and the concurrent fielding and 
full operational capability of organic AMCM resident in multi-mission capable MH-
60 airframes. The transition of airframes will be without degradation of the forces’ 
surge capability that the current AMCM construct provides.  This capability will be 
inherent in CONUS-based MH-60 squadrons that are not deployed but otherwise 
engaged in various phases of inter-deployment training and maintenance.41 
The goal of organic mine countermeasure operations is to enable naval 
forces to conduct their war fighting missions without being exposed to the risks of 
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operations in mined waters.  Naval forces can begin to shape the battlespace by 
conducting organic mine countermeasure operations by utilizing mapping, survey 
and intelligence databases which have been updated and detailed through mine 
countermeasure surveillance operations.  This approach to MCM will provide 
combatants the ability to detect and avoid sea mines.  Information provided by 
organic mine countermeasure operations will also be used to plan and focus the 
efforts of arriving dedicated mine countermeasure forces should they be required 
to conduct mine clearance operations to further shape the battlespace.42 
  
Figure 6.   AMCM Organic Mine Countermeasures Engagement Envelope43 
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a. AN/AQS-20A Mine Hunting System 
The organic MCM systems-of-systems are designed to provide this 
rapid capability for the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups.  As mentioned 
above, there is no one “silver bullet” that will counter the mine threat.  
Tomorrow’s suite of organic systems are designed to counter sea mines in 
varying environments ranging from deep water to the shallow water zones of the 
world’s littoral regions.  To prosecute mines throughout varying depths, a suite of 
organic MCM system-of-systems will be utilized to survey, localize, identify and 
neutralize these threats.  These systems include the AN/AQS-20A, which is a 
system designed to be towed by a helicopter or the RMS.  The towed body 
includes side-looking (SLS), gap-filling (GFS), volume-searching (VSS), and 
forward-looking sonar’s (FLS).   
 
Figure 7.   AN/AQS-20A Sonar and Electro-optic Identification44  
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The AN/AQS-20A will be effective against bottom and moored 
mines in both deep and shallow waters.  It will provide an increase in area 
coverage rate in comparison to the current AN/AQS-24A sonar system currently 
employed by dedicated AMCM helicopters.  In addition to its sonar’s, the 
AN/AQS-20A sonar system can be fitted with an integrated electro-optic 
identification (EOID) device which will provide an identification capability of 
previously localized mine like objects.  Unlike the AN/AQS-24A’s laser 
identification device, the EOID of the AN/AQS-20A must be installed after the 
volume search sonar has been removed.  It is designed to provide a rapid 
detection, classification, localization, and identification of bottom, close tethered, 
and volume mines.  This capability will enable combatants at sea to transit or 
avoid mined areas in choke points and littoral areas with a high degree of self-
protection. 
 
Table 1. Sonar Performance Capability Comparison45  
b. Localization of Surface and Near Surface Mines  
For several years, the U.S. Navy has been evaluating electro optics 
as a method of locating sea mines.  Lasers have become more powerful and 
compact and their wavelengths more tunable.  The use of a blue-green laser, 
which has a frequency compatible with seawater, allows a Light Detection and 
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Ranging (LIDAR) system to provide accurate information on the characteristics of 
targets at various water depths.  This technology will provide the Fleet self 
protection when traveling through choke points and confined straits, as well as 
rapid reconnaissance of minefields in support of amphibious operations.  The 
AN/AES-1 ALMDS is an electro optics mine reconnaissance system that detects 
and localizes drifting, floating and shallow water moored mines from the MH-60S 
helicopter.  This non-towed system is designed for use in the surface and near 
surface engagement envelope.  ALMDS represents a capability that does not 
exist in today’s mine countermeasure inventory.  As a non-towed system, 
ALMDS provides flexibility to the helicopter crews to transit a suspected area of 
interest without the restrictions of towed systems.  This is a new rapid search and 
reconnaissance capability of floating and near surface mine for the MCM force.  
 
Figure 8.   Airborne Laser Mine Detection System46 
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c. Neutralization Capabilities    
The Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) will be fielded in 
two versions designed to be deployed by both the organic and dedicated 
airborne assets.  Both systems will provide a capability to target sea mines by a 
remotely operated, expendable, mine neutralization system.  The system is 
designed to work in concert with sonar systems.  The sonar systems localize and 
identify sea mines, after which the AMNS reacquires and destroys the mines with 
a self contained shaped charge.  MH-60S aircrews will utilize the Archerfish 
neutralization system to remotely navigate to the target from the helicopter using 
information gained from the systems onboard sonar and ultimately its camera 
while in close proximity to its intended target.  After the neutralizer reaches its 
target, the operator initiates the burning of the shaped charge, which destroys the 
target.  The MH-53E utilizes the Seafox, which is currently deployed under a 
Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC).  The AMNS System was originally designed 
for use aboard the MH-53E.  Although the Seafox was near completion, 
programmatic changes with the development of the AMNS system led to the 
creation of a new more compact system that would be fielded aboard the MH-
60S.  The AMNS Seafox RDC provides a limited identification and neutralization 
capability to the dedicated AMCM force.   Both the Archerfish and Seafox are 




Figure 9.   Archerfish Airborne Mine Neutralization System47 
The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) is another 
neutralization capability planned for the next generation MCM systems.  It is 
designed as a helicopter-borne weapon system that fires a special 20mm 
supercavitating projectile from a modified Bushmaster high velocity gun.  The 
system has a blue-green LIDAR which searches for floating or near surface 
mines and targeting laser system that locks on to the mine with the gun’s 
targeting laser that works in conjunction with the gun’s computer to neutralize 
surface and near-surface mines. 
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Figure 10.   Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System48 
d. Airborne Influence Mine Sweeping    
When it is impractical to hunt or neutralize sea mines due to 
environmental conditions, sweeping for mines is a tactical initiative used to 
minimize the risk of encountering influence sea mines.  The Organic Airborne 
and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) is a high speed magnetic and acoustic 
influence mine sweeping system designed to support mine clearance operations.  
It consists of a towed magnetic and acoustic source, a tow and power delivery 
cable, a power conditioning and control subsystem, and an external or palletized 
power supply.  Its ability to fully demagnetize allows the system to be transported 
in the helicopter allowing for fast transit to over the horizon operating areas.  This 
system is designed to counter influence mines from the near surface to sea bed 
engagement zones.   
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Figure 11.   OASIS Concept of Operation49 
Dedicated MCM employs a similar system; the MK-106 which 
delivers a greater power output from its magnetic generator.  This increase in 
power output subsequently produces an increased magnetic influence signature 
greater than that of the OASIS influence system.  Although the legacy system 
produces an increased signature, it comes at a cost; the legacy system can not 
be carried internally to the helicopter which limits its ability to conduct operations 
over the horizon at distances away from the helicopter’s host platform.  
e. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations  
Working in conjunction with the organic airborne assets the 
AN/WLD-1(V)1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) is a system that operates 
remotely away from its host platform.  The RMS is designed to meet fleet 
                                            
49 Jason Lopez, J. (2006). Surface Mine Countermeasures [Graphic Image]. From PMS 495 
Mine Warfare Presentation (p. 27). Washington, D.C.: PEO LMW Washington Navy Yard. 
 42
requirements for beyond line-of-sight mine reconnaissance against bottom and 
moored mines in deep and shallow water regions.  This semi-autonomous 
system will detect, classify, identify and localize volume, and tethered, close-
tethered, mines and record their precise location for avoidance and, or 
subsequent removal.  The system has been designed to be integral to forces 
deployed anywhere in the world, providing an organic mine countermeasures 
capability to surface combatant forces in the absence of dedicated mine 
countermeasure forces.  RMS will provide continuous, unmanned, over-the-
horizon capability to determine the presence or absence of mines.    
The RMS will be installed first on DDG 91 and then on the following 
ARLEIGH BURKE Class hulls.  It will be fully integrated into the ship's undersea 
warfare combat system and include a launch and recovery system integral to the 
ship.  Other surface ships that are being considered as host platforms are the 
High Speed Vessel-X2, which will be an interim replacement for an MCM 
command ship and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).50   
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Figure 12.   Remote Mine Hunting System with AN/AQS-20A Sonar51 
A key requirement of Sea Power 21 is the ability to use the sea as 
maneuver space while operating in the complex littoral threat environment and 
potential contested or denied waters.  This environment poses a very robust 
surveillance threat of coordinated attack from land, air, and sea-based weapons 
systems, including sea mines.  A basic tenet of sea based maneuver warfare is 
the ability to apply our resources against the adversary’s weaknesses.  To this 
end, forward deployed naval forces must possess an organic intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability with which to clandestinely assess 
the presence and extent of the threat and to identify the location of suspected 
threats.  Such an organic capability must be responsive to strategic, tactical and 
on scene commander tasking and would typically be used in advance of other 
forces entering a denied area.  
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In support of strategic requirements or prior to operations in 
potentially contested or denied waters the Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV) will be deployed from submarines to conduct 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW), MCM and additional data collection operations.  Although no single 
system can provide the required capability in all tactical situations against the full 
scope of threats within the entire battlespace, the MRUUV system will have the 
clandestine reconnaissance and communications capability to assess potential 
operating areas in preparation for future operations.  Planning data about an area 
and a potential adversary may include, but is not limited to: electronic order of 
battle, detection of critical radio frequency signatures, force disposition, level and 
content of communications, movement of troops and material, details of shore 
installations and meteorological information required in support of potential 
military operations. 
 
Figure 13.   MRUUV Operational Concept Graphic52 
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To connect tomorrow’s MIW system-of-systems together under an 
effective war fighting discipline, data from surveillance, reconnaissance, 
environmental conditions, mine identification, battle damage assessment, as well 
as topographical data will require a netted system that warfare commanders will 
utilize to construct war fighting plans.  As an enabler of Sea Power 21, 
FORCEnet provides the link of all war fighting data connected under the 
discipline of C4ISR.  As an integral naval component of the DoD wide Internet 
Protocol based advanced network, FORCEnet will provide the open architecture 
and building blocks that integrate sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons, 
warriors, and supporting systems into a highly adaptive, human-centric, 
comprehensive system that operates from seabed to space and from sea to land.  
By facilitating comprehensive battlespace awareness, it will support the 
attainment of dimensional superiority by geographically dispersed forces as they 
execute a wide variety of missions across the entire range of military operations. 
It is focused on accelerating the speed and accuracy of information gathering, 
assessment, decision and action at every level of command.53   
Mine warfare command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems will link the Mine 
Countermeasures Commander with mine warfare forces and other Expeditionary 
Warfare elements.  Linking the overarching littoral MCM war fighting picture has 
taken on a new thrust with the development of an embedded capability within the 
C4ISR network.  To better understand and quantify the significance of the mine 
warfare problem, the U.S. Navy has embarked on a course that includes 
coordination and analysis of worldwide seafloor data and development of mission 
planning systems, such as the Mine Warfare Environmental Decision Aid Library 
(MEDAL).  MEDAL uses descriptive parameters to define bottom composition for 
a wide range of depositional environments.  Information can be obtained in situ 
from diver reports, extracted from acoustical data, or viewed from a video camera 
                                            
53 Gordon England, ADM Vern Clark, GEN Michael Hagee (2003) Assured Access and 
Projection of Power…From the Sea: Naval Transformation Road Map 2003. Washington, D.C.  
 46
on a mine neutralization vehicle.  Bottom sediment databases containing 70 
categories of sediment descriptions are automatically input into MEDAL.  Bottom 
roughness and clutter density databases are input into MEDAL as defined by 
MIW doctrine.  Incorporation of the MEDAL tactical decision aid into Joint 
Maritime Command Information System and the Global Command and Control 
System Maritime has strengthened the Mine Countermeasures Commander's 
relationship to the Carrier Strike and Expeditionary Strike Groups digital 
information exchange, and contribution to the common operational picture.54    
2. Summary of Dedicated MCM Limitations and Benefits   
In reviewing future concepts and operational drivers basic to the conduct 
of effective mine warfare activities; the most pertinent operational benefits and 
limitations of legacy MIW system-of-systems include:  
• High infrastructure and support costs for dedicated MCM 
• Dedicated surface MCM require lengthy transit times  
• No beyond-line-of-sight data transfer capability for dedicated 
systems 
• Dedicated AMCM is limited to daytime only operation 
• Significant personnel and equipment are needed to conduct and 
sustain MH-53E operations 
• Potentially long transit distances are associated with land basing  
• Reduced overall area coverage rates for dedicated sonar systems   
• The MH-53E has a higher sustained mission time than the MH-60S 
• Dedicated AMCM and EOD systems are deployed reasonably 
rapidly 
• Dedicated AMCM and EOD can achieve high area coverage rates 
• Sustained MCM clearance operations can be achieved with 
dedicated systems  
                                            
54 Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, (2000).  Oceanography and 
Mine Warfare.  (0-309-51587-4) Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 47
3. Summary of Organic MCM Limitations and Benefits  
• Sparse sweeping capabilities for the MH-60S  
• Organic MCM requires reduced force protection requirements  
• Organic systems provide a limited punch through MCM capability  
• Organic assets are embedded with forces at sea 
• Rapid response for early situational awareness   
• Networked to force commanders through C4ISR capability  
• The Joint Force is enabled to conduct simultaneous warfare 
operations   
• Enemy area denial capabilities are dismantled with reduced risk  
• Reduced percent of combat power    
• Reduced replacement cost of off board systems  
• The enemy's ISR and targeting problems become more complex  
• Higher staying power in the littoral is achieved  
• Enhanced covert and clandestine operations55 
Several of these operational constraints such as limited basing options, 
mine clearance capability, and data transfer constraints for the present dedicated 
MH-53E will be resolved by planned upgrades to the MH-53E or, in the case of 
basing constraints, by fleet introduction of the organic MH-60S.  These airborne 
MCM helicopters have significant vulnerabilities.  They are particularly vulnerable 
to attack because they are constrained in maneuverability when towing.  They 
must sometimes operate within easy range of well-hidden shore-based, hostile 
units.  When towing they are constrained to a fixed altitude and speed, forming 
an easy target for even rudimentary surface-to-air weapons.  The general trend 
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helicopters for airborne MCM will be increasingly subject to attack by hostile 
aircraft, helicopters, small craft, and shore-based anti-aircraft units equipped to 
fire heat-seeking or radio frequency homing missiles. 56 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The deadly threat posed by mines exists whether or not hostilities have 
ceased.  While armies move inland and surface combatants sail to other shores, 
minesweepers often remain in a theater of operations to ensure that a port or 
beachhead remains clear of mines to allow follow-on support for the flow of 
ground troops.  As a result, minesweepers are often the first and last ships to 
operate in a given area.  In at least two cases during World War II minesweepers 
were the first and last ships sunk in a campaign.  Such is the great threat of mine 
warfare that the mere suspicion of the presence of mines is often all that is 
required to limit naval operations.  At present, the U.S. Navy has two options if a 
mine threat is encountered while it is attempting to project power in the littoral 
regions of the world.  The U.S. Navy can equip its surface combatants with MCM 
capabilities or it can summon its dedicated MCM forces and personnel.  
However, both of these options have limitations.  If mines are laid in large 
numbers and types, fleet assets equipped with limited MCM capabilities may not 
be sufficient to neutralize the threat.  If dedicated MCM forces are then required 
they must be mobilized and deployed from the continental United States or pre-
deployed because they do not have the ability to operate organically with the 
battleforce.  Thus, timely and effective MCM operations could be the key to the 
success of an operation from the sea.  Based on these considerations the U.S. 
Navy requires dedicated MCM forces that are able to operate forward-deployed 
and organically with the battleforce.57 
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Efficacy of Organic to the Battleforce Mine Countermeasures Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 
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With the introduction of organic MCM into the Fleet, these seven new 
systems must be integrated into a diverse fleet of ships and sailors.  The impact 
on readiness should be as minimal as possible.  It is imperative that these 
systems share a common systems architecture that accounts realistically for 
differences between the new technology and the existing systems and facilitates 
their integration.  It is not as clear, however, that the new systems have been 
considered within the constraints implied by the other organic systems.  An 
overall MCM systems architecture is needed to ensure that common standards 
are adopted, or that different standards applied to various systems will not 
impede the interoperability of the overall MCM system-of-systems.  The MCM 
architecture should ensure the utilization of common components and 
subsystems such as displays, data formats, commands, operating procedures, 
maintenance, storage, and spares.  It should establish the formats, rates, 
quantity, and quality of data as well as the interfaces between various 
communication systems that transfer the data to established databases. 58  
Many plans focus on building block like doctrine, organization, and 
technology.  Although necessary, these elements leave out one critical element, 
how the blocks are put together.  In a networked force it is more important than 
ever to ensure proper coordination and timely integration of assets.   
Transformation involves various building blocks and different ways of combining 
them.  Choosing between incremental or revolutionary approach is not the right 
framework for managing transformation.  Systems integration, linking separate 
parts of an organization so weaker ones do not limit improving one, is key.  Since 
the armed forces are moving towards a more networked operation, this approach 
can be applied throughout the defense and intelligence communities from the 
highest level to the lowest.59  
                                            
58 Committee for Naval Warfare Assessment Naval Study Board,  Division on Engineering 
and Physical Science National research Council (2001).  Operational and Technical Challenges 
for Naval Forces.  National Academy Press Washington, D.C. 
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III. TRANSITIONING TO FUTURE MIW CONOPS 
A. INTRODUCTION   
Today’s DoD acquisition community measures success based on meeting 
cost, schedule and performance goals.  The DoD differs from the commercial 
industry based on its determination of success.  The commercial industry 
measures success based on profit, where the DoD ultimately measures success 
based on its ability to win wars.  There are any number of external factors that 
affect the process of DoD systems development, which includes the Planning 
Programming Budgeting System (PPBS), and to a lesser extent the political 
climate.  Although commercial projects have their own fiscal constraints and 
consumer environment to contend with, products developed in the commercial 
realm are less affected by their planned budget and consumer environment.  In 
addition to external factors, the DoD tends to concentrate its efforts based on 
advances in technology, where many commercial industries minimize risks by 
relying on mature, stable and proven technologies. 
Successful DoD management of cost, schedule, and performance risks is 
tied to the ability of a program’s team to fully attain knowledge about key 
dimensions of the product under development.  Knowledge means that program 
managers and decision makers have reached virtual certainty about all aspects 
of the product being developed, such as critical manufacturing processes.  In 
essence, knowledge is the inverse of risk.  Regardless of the product being 
developed, at some point in the process the program team attains full knowledge 
about all aspects of that product.  Commercial teams achieve this knowledge 
earlier than their DoD counterparts.  Levels of knowledge that most significantly 
affect program outcomes converge at three critical points: the first being when a 





second when the product’s design is determined to be capable of meeting 
performance requirements and finally when the product is determined to be 
producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets.60  
Contrary to commercial best practices and development philosophy to 
attain all aspects of knowledge before design, Steve Jobs, Apple’s Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) embraced risk by taking a completely different approach 
with the development of Apple’s newest product lines.  “New things don’t want to 
be born”, says Jobs.  Innovation causes problems, and it’s much easier simply to 
avoid it.  Apple employees talk incessantly about what they call “deep 
collaboration” or “cross-pollination” or “concurrent engineering.”  Essentially, it 
means that products don’t pass from team to team; there isn’t a discrete, 
sequential development stages for product subsystems.  Product development 
instead, is simultaneous and organic.  Products get worked on in parallel by all 
departments at once: design, hardware and software in endless rounds of 
interdisciplinary design reviews.  When the challenges are that complex, you 
have to develop a product in a more collaborative, integrated way.61 
Although Apple’s CEO cites prudent observations regarding problems 
associated with creativity and product development, he demands innovation to a 
level uncommon in commercial industry.  Jobs’ approach to innovation has 
allowed Apple to be deeply rooted as a world-wide commercial power house.  
This already established company has expanded its niche market for Apple 
Macintosh computers, their software operating system and has introduced its 
newest products, the iPod and Apples’ iTunes.  These products have spanned 
the globe and crossed boundaries to include personal computer users as well as 
traditional Apple users.  The world-wide acceptance of these products is based 
primarily on two key elements; compatibility and ease of use.  This seemingly 
                                            
60 K. Schnasi, P. Francis, M. Sullivan, M. Bonner, B. Luby, M. Santos, et al. (2000). Applying 
Best Practices to Weapon Systems Takes the Right Environment. Program Managers Guide 
(January-February). 
61 Lev Grossman, (2005, October) What’s Next How Apple Does It. Time Canada, 166 No. 
17.  
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simple innovation has been integrated across various product lines with relatively 
simple and straight forward human systems interface.  The iPod has been 
integrated as a personal portable stereo and digital data storage device to a 
seamlessly integrated portable jukebox for your vehicle that is smaller than the 
size of a pack of cigarettes.  
Similar to Apple’s approach, the DoD looks to innovative design to achieve 
superiority on the battlefield.  Currently, there is a tendency to concentrate on the 
mechanisms that various systems use to interoperate.  However, focusing solely 
on mechanisms misses a larger problem.  Creating and maintaining 
interoperable systems-of-systems requires interoperation not only at the 
mechanistic level, but also at the levels of system construction and program 
management.  Improved interoperation will not happen by accident and will 
require changes at many levels.  Interoperability is a difficult challenge.  This is 
true whether the goal is to increase interoperability between systems that 
originally did not interact, or to build new systems designed to interoperate. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about interoperability requirements at the start 
of a program.  In some cases, the systems that will interoperate are not yet 
conceived.  This approach to product development is contrary to exercising 
commercial best practices and attainment of all aspects of knowledge.  Thus, 
new strategies must be developed to anticipate future needs and cope with 
current uncertainty.  In other cases, the constraints imposed by existing systems 
make approaches to achieving interoperability equally complex.62 
Getting better outcomes on weapon system programs will take more than 
attempting to graft commercial best practices onto the existing acquisition 
process.  There are underlying reasons and incentives for why such practices are 
not a natural part of how weapon systems are bought.  Environmental factors, 
such as the intense competition for funding when a program is launched, 
encourage lower standards of knowledge and the acceptance of higher, but 
                                            
62 E. Morris, L. Levine, C. Meyers, P. Price, D. Plakosh, (2004). System of Systems 
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unrecognized, risks.  For an acquisition process to meet DoD’s goal of 
developing and producing militarily superior weapons in a resource-constrained 
environment, you must ask the basic question of how a capability can best be 
provided to the customer.  The characteristics of best practices suggest a 
process for developing new capabilities, whether they are commercial or defense 
products, which are based on knowledge.  It is a process in which technology 
development and product development are treated differently and managed 
separately.  The process of developing technology culminates in discovery and 
must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays, contrary to the 
DoD’s schedule driven process.   
The process of developing a product culminates in delivery, and therefore, 
gives great weight to design and production.  A knowledge-based process is 
essential to getting better cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. This 
means that decision makers must have virtual certainty about critical facets of the 
product under development when needed.  Such knowledge is the inverse of 
risk.  Most commercial and military programs do not follow the same processes 
in their development cycles.  However, at some point, full knowledge is attained 
about a completed product, regardless of what development approach was 
taken.63 
Although the DoD’s desired approach to system innovation aligns with 
Jobs’ philosophy and attempts to achieve similar outcomes, the environment 
under which the DoD functions tends to limit its ability to accurately model the 
Apple paradigm.  Innovative design provides an ability to achieve a superior 
fighting force, but that same innovative drive increases risk for cost, schedule 
and performance requirements.  In an attempt to achieve the best of both 
commercial and the DoD systems acquisition, having a clear understanding of 
system requirements is central to the satisfaction of the customer, or in this case 
to sustain a war fighting superiority second to none.  
                                            
63 General Accounting Office (1999, March 19) Best Commercial Practices Can Improve 
Program Outcomes.  Washington D.C. Government Printing Office. 
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B. LINKING FUTURE MIW REQUIREMENTS WITH DESIGN 
Accelerating rates of change will make the future environment more 
unpredictable and less stable, presenting our Armed Forces with a wide range of 
plausible futures.  Whatever direction global change ultimately takes, it will affect 
how we think about and conduct joint and multinational operations in the 21st 
century.  How we respond to dynamic changes concerning potential adversaries, 
technological advances and their implications, and the emerging importance for 
information superiority will dramatically impact how well our Armed Forces can 
perform its duties in 2010.  Most importantly, these active and passive measures 
will be combined to provide a more seamless joint architecture for force 
protection, which will leverage the contributions of individual services, systems, 
and echelons.  The result will be improved freedom of action for friendly forces, 
and better protection at all echelons against precision attack, weapons of mass 
destruction, and other conventional or non-conventional systems.64 
At the operational level, mine warfare's layered defense architecture, as 
articulated in Joint Vision 2010, is extended to provide theater-wide defense and 
full-dimensional protection for operating forces during periods of peace and 
conflict.  At the theater level, forward-based supporting MCM forces are available 
during peacetime periods to augment strategic-level bottom mapping and survey 
operations, and during conflict to quickly move to engage mines that have been 
laid.  Additionally, theater and strategic systems and organizations combine to 
provide C4ISR and environmental data to support MIW.  During periods of rising 
tensions or conflict, theater mine defense draws from all joint force MIW 
resources to reduce the mine threat, including preemptive countermining and 
Maritime Interdiction Operations to prevent mining.  In cases where self-
protection is not an issue, forward deployed supporting MCM forces can conduct 
extensive advance operations prior to the arrival of other operational forces.  
 
                                            
64 Chairman of The Joint Chief of Staff, (2000) Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing 
for Tomorrow, Washington, D.C.  
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Each of these activities has considerable implications for linking organic and 
dedicated MIW forces and organizations.  As always, connectivity is an important 
element to overall MIW success.65  
Although tomorrow’s next generation systems are being developed as 
separate and distinct programs, their individual design and functionality are 
linked to an overall MIW capability that is tied to tomorrow’s strategic vision.  As 
illustrated above and throughout this study, the sea mine threat varies with depth, 
actuation, lethality, and complexity.  There is no one solution to counter the 
variety of sea mines in all environments.  Tomorrow’s next generation systems-
of-systems along with dedicated and proven technologies will collectively provide 
a capability beyond today’s MCM fighting force.   
  
Figure 14.   Mine Threat Environment66 
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The DoD has fully embraced the ideology of interoperability, innovation 
and commercial best practices as discussed in publications such as the Program 
Managers Guide, Acquisition Reform and Joint Forces Quarterly.  This new 
approach to weapon systems development has been further supported by official 
correspondence such as the Instruction for Modular Open Systems Architecture 
from the Secretary of Defense.  As previously mentioned, plans that focus 
exclusively on the building blocks such as doctrine, organization, and technology 
are leaving out one critical element; specifically how the blocks are put together.  
The spirit behind many of the DoD’s future visions such as: Transformation, Sea 
Power 21 and Acquisition Reform are linked by one premise: a capabilities based 
fighting force to counter an asymmetric threat.  The framework behind MOSA can 
serve as the roadmap for tomorrow’s transformation of the DoD system-of-
systems development.   
C. ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE  
The application of MOSA is consistent with sound system engineering 
principles; however, it requires a different mindset as the systems engineering 
process is executed during the design of a system and then repeated throughout 
the life-cycle of that system.  Characterized by modular design, key interfaces, 
and the use of open standards for key interfaces where appropriate, MOSA is 
focused on a system design that is modular, has well defined interfaces, is 
designed for change and, to the extent possible, utilizes widely supported 
industry standards for key interfaces. 
Systems engineering controls are used to track decisions and 
requirements, maintain technical baselines, manage interfaces, manage risks, 
track cost and schedule, track technical performance, verify requirements are 
met, review and audit the development progress.  During the systems 




understand the system.   The word “architecture” is used in various contexts in 
the general field of engineering.  It is used as a general description of how the 
subsystems join together to form the system.67  
 
Figure 15.   Systems Engineering Process68 
Partitioning a system appropriately during the design process to isolate 
functionality makes the system easier to develop, maintain, and modify or 
upgrade.  Given a system designed for modularity, functions that change rapidly 
or evolve over time can be upgraded and changed with minor impact to the 
remainder of the system.  This occurs when the design process starts with 
modularity and future evolution as an objective.  The focus of MOSA is not on 
control and management of all the interfaces within and between systems.  It will 
                                            
67 Defense Acquisition University (2001). Systems Engineering Fundamentals. Defense 
Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA.  
68 Defense Acquisition University (2001). Systems Engineering Fundamentals. [Graphic 
Image] (p. 6), Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA. 
 59
be very costly and perhaps impractical to manage hundreds and in some cases 
thousands of interfaces used within and among systems.  MOSA manages the 
interfaces by grouping them into key and non-key interfaces.  It distinguishes 
among interfaces that are between technologically stable and volatile modules, 
between highly reliable and more frequently failing modules, and between 
modules with least interoperability impact and those that pass vital 
interoperability information.  Key interfaces should utilize open standards in order 
to produce the largest life-cycle cost benefits.69  
 
Figure 16.   MOSA Key Interfaces70 
                                            
69 Open Systems Joint Task Force. (2004). Program Manager’s Guide, A Modular Open 
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As previous illustrated, naval MCM programs employ a mix of mine field 
ISR, hunting, neutralization and sweeping which constitute a capability through a 
multi-disciplined system-of-systems.  Collectively the resulting capabilities, 
together with support from C4ISR systems and MEDAL data connectivity are 
intended to provide U.S. Naval Forces with open-ocean and littoral minefield 
maneuverability with an acceptable level of risk.   
 
Figure 17.   Excerpt of MIW Architectural Framework 
Expanding the above notional architecture to include all MIW disciplines 
will provide a framework for engineers and Program Managers to view 
tomorrow’s MIW system-of-systems not as stove piped individual innovations, but 
as a complete framework to focus the development of a war fighting capability.  
Additionally, best business and commercial practices, such as Balanced Score 
Card and, or risk and decision aid software such as Palisade Precision Tree 
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Analysis may be incorporated to ensure that established metrics and risk 
management plans can be monitored to provide an overall risk assessment to 
planned capabilities. 
 
Figure 18.   Notional Future MIW Capabilities Architecture 
1. Science and Technology Prospective  
In February 1999 the Naval Research Advisory Committee was tasked by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, 
to conduct a study to determine the application of unmanned vehicles (UV’s) in 
MCM operations and to identify alternatives.  The tasking included a review of 
current programs under development, with a view toward determining gaps and 
overlaps.  Based on the findings, the study was to make recommendations for 
future UV requirements.  Technology and system demonstrations need to be 
carried out in a context that is increasingly realistic about the threat and 
 62
environment, as well as about appropriate time lines.  It is fair to say that 
limitations of the state-of-the-art in vehicles, sensors, computation, 
communications and navigation preclude the effective use of unmanned vehicles 
from the very shallow to surf zone.  No current or near-term unmanned vehicle 
capability for underwater communications and precise navigation exists for the 
surf zone.  Recently initiated science and technology programs offer 
opportunities for future demonstrations and transitions in the surf zone to very 
shallow water.71 
2. Limitations of Tomorrow’s Next Generation Systems     
Unfortunately, mine hunting is not effective in 60 percent of the littoral 
regions near potential adversaries. Sea access to these areas requires 
minesweeping.  Currently, the MH-53E and the MK-106 sled, or the MH-60S with 
the developmental OASIS system, are needed to meet world-wide operation 
plans for minesweeping.  Many of the same technologies that are driving the 
improvements in mine hunting could be leveraged in an effort to develop an 
unmanned minesweeping system.  A desire to keep the man out of the very 
shallow minefield makes unmanned minesweeping systems an attractive option.  
Unmanned systems are the minesweepers and hunters of the future.  The 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Mine and Undersea Warfare, Dale 
Gerry, during his brief at the fourth international symposium on technology and 
the mine problem, stated: 
We are looking to you to help fill our capability gaps.  Our number 
one priority is to be able to get from the 40 foot water depth, 
through the surf, to the beach exit zone in order to get our Marines 
ashore.  We still have the age-old problem of countering buried and 
pressure mines.72   
                                            
71 Naval Research Advisory Committee. (2000). Unmanned Vehicles (UV) In Mine 
Countermeasures, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office. 
72 Dale Gerry (2000, March 12). [Address]. Address presented at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. Monterey, CA. [Transcript]. Retrieved June 16, 2006 from: 
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Operating in the very shallow water and surf zone, 40 feet or less makes 
underwater communications more difficult and variable.  As operations move 
onto the beach where ground robotics might be applicable, these systems remain 
to be proven, particularly given the threat posed by buried mines and obstacles. 
Precise underwater navigation must be achieved in all depths, and data fusion 
for a common tactical picture must be achieved.  Assured neutralization remains 
a high-end challenge.  Finally, as history will reflect, the ability to reduce the size 
and cost of the vehicles and their sensors while increasing reliability and 
capability will most likely be the greatest challenge.73   
D. REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY 
To ensure that affordable, technically achievable requirements are 
attained, the MIW program demanded an immediate focus on systems 
engineering and requirements traceability.  As a system-of-systems, the above 
notional MIW architecture will depend heavily on system maturation and 
interoperability.  To provide a capability to the user as rapidly as possible, the 
DoD has adopted spiral development principles.  Initial fleet introduction for the 
most mature of the newly designed next generation systems was planned for a 
2005 delivery, but as a result of unforeseen developmental barriers, fleet 
introduction was delayed by two years for some systems and as much as four 
years for less mature technologies.  Spiral development in conjunction with 
requirements traceability can be used to manage developmental and capability 
based risks as well as providing the end user a capability, rather than delivering a 
fully mature system much late.  Unlike some new acquisition programs, MIW 
systems requirements were already defined by a need to recapitalize current 
capabilities, rather than to develop new war fighting functions.  Establishing a 
systems architectural process that seamlessly links requirements from 
capabilities documents to performance specifications of war fighting needs can 
be captured by creating an MIW requirements traceability matrix. 
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Table 2. Notional MIW Traceability Matrix74 
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E. FORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION 
There are significant risks and costs associated with using expensive, 
high-end, power projection platforms against the enemy's fairly inexpensive air, 
surface, and undersea platforms with their associated combat and information 
technologies.  Declining force numbers further impair the ability of our capital 
ships to perform additional access missions.  Further, it is unlikely that, in the 
foreseeable future, U.S. Naval Forces will be able to afford the numbers of multi-
mission high end ships it would take to fill the gaps in needed littoral capabilities.  
LCS will contribute to SEA SHIELD through its unique capability to respond 
quickly, to operate in the littoral environment, and to conduct focused missions 
with a variety of networked off board systems.  Approximately 60 percent of the 
missions conducted by ships are mobility related missions.  The current practice 
of using multi-mission combatant ships to conduct mobility missions because of a 
lack of alternatives has consequences of high operating costs, increased 
operational and personnel tempo, high maintenance expense of complex units, 
and reduced availability and readiness for combat-associated missions.  With 
modularity and open architecture, LCS has an inherent capability to remove the 
MIW, SUW and ASW mission modules, freeing up space and weight capacity to 
support a host of other non-access missions.75 
The littoral battlespace requires focused capabilities in greater numbers to 
assure access against asymmetrical threats.  The LCS is envisioned to be a 
networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access 
and asymmetric threats in the littorals.  It will have the capability to deploy 
independently to overseas littoral regions, remain on station for extended periods 
of time either with a ships at sea or through a forward-basing arrangement.  It will 
operate with Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups, in groups of other similar 
ships, or independently for diplomatic and presence missions.  Additionally, it will 
have the capability to operate cooperatively with the U.S. Coast Guard and 
                                            
75 Navy Warfare Development Command, (2003, February). Littoral Combat Ship Concept of 
Operations, Version 3.1, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.   
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Allies.  The LCS will rely heavily on manned and unmanned vehicles to execute 
assigned missions and operate as part of a netted, distributed force.  In order to 
conduct successful combat operations in an adverse littoral environment, it will 
employ technologically advanced weapons, sensors, data fusion, C4ISR, 
propulsion, optimal manning concepts, smart control systems and self-defense 
systems.  The LCS will be the Navy’s most innovative, modularized and 
reconfigurable ship capable of being reconfigured into any one of three different 
warfare packages within a day’s time.  The MIW module includes the RMS; the 
AN/AQS-20A sonar mine detecting system; OASIS; ALMDS; RAMICS and the 
AMNS.  At the heart of the ASW module is the Advanced Deployable System.  
This system is a bottom array that may be deployed from the LCS at high 
speeds, providing high-quality acoustic surveillance data.  Additionally, the ASW 
module includes acoustic sensors such as a multifunction towed array, and a 
remote towed active source, along with other detection systems and weapons 
designed for use aboard the MH-60R helicopter and unmanned surface vessels.  
The SUW module includes weapons such as a 30mm cannon, the same as is 
used in the RAMICS.76 
The key to the successful integration of the five OAMCM systems is a roll-
on, roll-off mission kit consisting of the MH-60S Common Console; the Carriage 
Stream Tow and Recovery System (CSTRS); and the Tactical Common Data 
Link (TCDL).  The Common Console is common to all five OAMCM systems as 
well as the other MH-60S missions and provides for control, monitor and display 
of the OAMCM system.  CSTRS is a modular device that will provide the 
capability to carry and deploy all five of the AMCM systems.  TCDL will provide a 
high-bandwidth, near-real time sensor data link with a relay capability to pass 
data to the Mine Warfare Commander.  Both the MH-60S and LCS bring a level 
of commonality and integration unprecedented in naval systems design.  Both 
vehicles are designed and formed to function in tomorrow’s war fighting vision.    
                                            
76 Program Executive Office Ships, (2006). What is LCS, Retrieved July, 20 2006 from 
http://peos.crane.navy.mil/lcs/program.htm.  
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
Innovative design has the potential of bringing unprecedented capability to 
the end user.  As illustrated in this study, the Apple Corporation has experienced 
the success of an innovative, modular and adaptable design.  Innovation has 
increased the U.S. DoD’s war fighting superiority and is unmatched by it closest 
rival.  Although the DoD attempts to align its acquisition process with that of 
successful commercial best practices, its need for innovative design contradicts 
the risk mitigation philosophy of attaining full knowledge of a system early in 
development.  This contradiction manifests itself in risks of unstable funding, 
system capability and, or potentially a delayed capability to war fighters in the 
field.    
The five organic airborne, two unmanned semi-autonomous systems and 
a netted data fusion infrastructure along with dedicated MCM units constitute 
tomorrow’s MIW capability.  All of the newly designed MIW systems, as well as 
upgrades to existing MCM programs where conceived at different times, 
individually provide different capabilities, and have various fielding timelines.  
Uniting these individual programs yields an MIW capability far superior to the pre-
Cold War era.  Linking these capabilities together under MOSA’s architectural 
framework provides a focused overarching management program that will 
minimize performance, cost and schedule risks.  As illustrated in the notional 
architecture, modularity provides a view to the overall MIW capability while 
simultaneously illustrating sub-components.   Removal of one sub-system does 
not negate the overall capability, and adding potential components have the 
potential for mitigating risk.   
Although uniting the system-of-systems under one framework reduces 
risk, linking them through the use of a requirements traceability matrix is crucial 
to managing the developmental as well as capabilities risks while conducting 




with the traceability matrix was designed to providing a forward and backward 
compatibility with user requirements, war fighting capability and systems 
development. 
These tools have been developed to provide the best means of meeting 
MIW product development as well as other war fighting disciplines within the 
DoD.  The use of these tools, although crucial to MIW weapon systems 
development, is just a small part of the overall development plan.  Another very 
crucial and intangible portion of the program’s architecture centers on 
commitment.  It will take commitment from key stakeholders as well as members 
external to the development process to achieve a viable MIW capability.  In the 
conduct of this research it was readily apparent that a number of best practices 
are currently being utilized by DoD Program Offices and defense contractors.  
These practices include tools such as Risk Management, the use of commercial 
off the shelf components, modeling and simulation early in program 
development, Lean, Six Sigma, Balanced Score Card, the use of traceability 
matrixes as well as numerous checks and balances throughout life cycle of 
various programs.   
Identifying military product development as purely an internal institution to 
the Defense Department would be a mischaracterization.  Many external factors 
can present a negative effect on product development.  These items include the 
congressional PPBS cycle, lobbyist vying for production in his or her State or 
district, P3I initiatives, evolving requirements as well as technology insertion.  
Chapter IV will conclude this research and examine how these influences have 
affected the development of tomorrow’s MIW system-of-systems and provide 
recommendations to limit their effect on system development.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION  
Mine countermeasures is a uniquely singular naval warfare discipline. Its 
capabilities have the potential of providing the means to reduce, if not mitigate 
the risk of encountering the threat of sea mines in the open-oceans and the 
world’s littorals.  To that end, MCM operations are a crucial tenet to current and 
future war fighting visions for the DoD.  Managing risks associated with the mine 
threat provides assured access for U.S. Naval Forces and extends to other U.S., 
and allied forces.  It has been noted throughout this study that the threat of sea 
mines are a force multiplier that has been in use since the days of the American 
Civil War.  This threat over time has increased in complexity and lethality.  
Keeping pace with this simple but deadly threat has been a difficult task to 
counter for the DoD.    
Sea mines have sunk many U.S. Navy ships, including minesweepers, 
and killed many sailors throughout history.  At least sixty-five ships and small 
craft were sunk by German and Japanese mines in World War II.  Mines were 
responsible for seventy percent of all casualties suffered by the U.S. Navy in the 
first two years of the Korean War.  They were also responsible for the sinking of 
all five ships lost by the U.S. Navy during that conflict.  With enough planning, 
time, and ships, an amphibious assault can be successful no matter how many 
enemy mines are present, but this comes at a cost.  The price paid comes in 
large numbers of lives and valuable assets.  Today, the American public and 
especially the media have come to view even small setbacks in military 
operations negatively.  To reduce the loss of life and valued assets, the U.S. 
Navy has embarked on improving its MIW capabilities.77  These capabilities  
 
                                            
77 Mathew McCarton (2000). One Hundred Years of Sweeping: A Historic Review of the 
Efficacy of Organic to the Battleforce Mine Countermeasures Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 
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come in a multi-faceted form; weapons, sensor systems, data gathering and 
fusion systems that are designed to travel with strike groups, or are forward-
deployed to rapidly address the mine threat.   
As the post-Cold War era shifts the focus of assured access to the world’s 
open-oceans and littorals, many new challenges presented by non-traditional 
foes bring to light an anti-access threat from asymmetric adversaries.  While the 
anti-access challenge is a problem for all joint forces, naval forces have 
traditionally played a major role in preserving U.S. freedom of action when 
forward bases have been unavailable.  They have also made important 
contributions to theater break-in operations.  As a result, the Navy and Marine 
Corps are likely to play an increasingly important role in power projection 
operations in the 21st century. The challenge of taking on anti-access networks 
in general, and naval anti-access networks in particular, is an especially critical 
one for fleet planners.  For the Navy and Marine Corps to be successful in a 
high-stakes operational competition against emerging anti-access networks, the 
21st century fleet will need enhanced, thoroughly integrated and networked 
defensive, strike, maneuver, mine warfare, and support capabilities.78 
Historically the sense of urgency created by encountering enemy mining 
campaigns has not been lasting.  Eventually, the need to maintain a highly 
responsive MCM capability was largely forgotten at various points throughout 
U.S. Naval history.  To avoid the possibility of having freedom of maneuver and 
projection of power ashore curtailed, the U.S. Navy should possess a dedicated 
and organic battleforce MCM capability.79  Notwithstanding the contributions 
maritime MCM capabilities bring to strategic military operations, having a robust 
countermining capability also has a definitive effect on the world’s economy.  The 
structure of foreign relations between sovereign nations tends to dictate choices 
                                            
78 Col. Robert O. Work, (2002). The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better. 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Washington, D.C.    
79 Mathew McCarton (2000). One Hundred Years of Sweeping: A Historic Review of the 
Efficacy of Organic to the Battleforce Mine Countermeasures Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 
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that would level the playing field.  In the past, this international behavior has often 
taken the form of “balancing” as states pursue security and economic strategies 
designed to enhance their survival and influence in an anarchic world.  There is 
no reason to believe that the world’s globalization system would change this 
basic behavior of sovereign nation’s attempts to maintain a level playing field.  
Within the dynamics of globalization the U.S. will be unable to “rest on past 
laurels” without forfeiting its global leadership role.  One key aspect of the future 
would entail the continued pursuit of the U.S. policies of proactive international 
engagement and global military superiority to reinforce the positives of 
globalization.80 
Indirectly, Sailors and Marines have a significant effect on the world’s 
economy and will be instrumental to the U.S. DoD transformation initiatives.  
Historically, both the Navy and Marine Corps embody the culture that will be at 
the heart of the future naval force.  However, the environment in which our 
Sailors, Marines, civilians, and contactors must operate has changed significantly 
since the all-volunteer military force was established thirty years ago, when the 
world was in the grips of the Cold War.  Today, threats to safety and security 
come from multiple directions, often in diffused and difficult to predict ways.  As 
the geopolitical ground shifts in ways not before imagined, being agile and having 
the means to produce military, political, and economic opportunities in an ever 
changing world is crucial to stability.  The post-Cold War era has ushered in a 
requirement to enable our MCM force to be far more agile and responsive to 
global mine threats than in years past. 81   The advent of tomorrow’s organic 
MCM systems coupled with advances to legacy MCM systems will provide a 
capability to meet an ever expanding threat of sea mines.  
In our most recent history, key stakeholders in congress and senior 
military leaders have seen the need to enhance the U.S. Navy’s MCM capability 
                                            
80 CDR John Pruitt, (2000). The Influence of Sea Power in the 21st Century, Retrieved May 
22, 2006, from: web.mit.edu/SSP/program/working.html. 
81 Gordon England, ADM Vern Clark, GEN Michael Hagee (2003) Assured Access and 
Projection of Power…From the Sea: Naval Transformation Road Map 2003. Washington, D.C. 
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to meet tomorrow’s threat.  Recognizing that the Navy’s mine warfare programs 
are so potentially important, and recognizing that developments in this warfare 
area has lagged behind those in other warfare areas, the U.S. Navy’s interest in 
MIW has taken a strong turn upward.  Naval Leaders were directed by the Chief 
of Naval Operations to ensure that MCM forces receive much more attention and 
become organic to battle forces at sea rather than remain exclusively the domain 
of a separate supporting force.  Although this mandate has served as the catalyst 
to focus a strong effort to revive this singular naval discipline, cultural and 
developmental barriers have slowed the push to integrate tomorrow’s system-of-
systems into mainstream U.S. Naval operations. 
During the spring of 1999 General Krupp, Director of Expeditionary 
Warfare and a host of civilian and military Defense Department officials 
addressed an annual conference sponsored by the National Defense Industrial 
Association on expeditionary warfare in Panama City, Florida.  During this 
conference, General Krupp identified that naval mine warfare programs remained 
woefully inadequate to meet the future needs of U.S. expeditionary forces.  
Senior leaders blame the problem both on shortage of funds and on a Navy 
culture that regards mine warfare as an unglamorous profession.  General Krupp 
stated: "We need to be able to send sailors and Marines across the beach 
without fear of stepping on mines ... We can't do that now."82 Since that 
conference approximately seven years ago the challenge of safely getting 
Marines and Sailors ashore remains an “Achilles’ Heel” for the U.S. DoD.  Yet 
since this renewed emphasis on MCM approximately seven years ago, the U.S. 
is not able to efficiently counter the near-term threat of sea mines.  Current MCM 
programs have brought the U.S. closer to providing an efficient means to conduct 
organic mine warfare operations, but these same improvement programs have 
major shortcomings that are exacerbated as a result of competing for limited 
resources, changing requirements, and stove-piped development plans.  In order 
                                            
82 Sandra I. Erwin (1999), Navy Faulted For Slow Fielding of Anti-Mine Systems, from: 
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/1999/Jan/Navy_Faulted.htm, Retrieved March 13, 
2006. 
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to efficiently manage the development of tomorrow’s next generation system-of-
systems, a new approach to product development must be adopted.  Adopting an 
overarching systems architecture based on MOSA principles is one way of 
meeting this complex development challenge.   
Open systems architecture identifies components, the relationship 
between components, and the rules for the architecture's composition.  An Open 
System Approach is based on an architecture that uses open standards to 
describe these relationships and rules. An open systems approach should 
facilitate the management of risks associated with the use of commercial items or 
non-developmental items.  Although the open systems approach, through the 
use of open specifications and standards, serves to mitigate risks on one hand, it 
also carries its own unique risks. The risks associated with products 
implementing open systems may be varied, but potential issues such as product 
availability, supportability, standards conformance and configuration control may 
need to be addressed.  The following are guidelines for consideration: 
• Adopt industry consensus based standards with market research 
that evaluates the short and long term availability of products built 
to industry accepted specifications and standards 
• Incorporate a disciplined systems engineering process that 
examines tradeoffs of performance, supportability and upgrade 
potential within defined cost constraint 
• Use an open systems approach for weapon systems electronics 
that provides a foundation for lower life cycle costs and improved 
weapons systems performance 
• Address the key considerations of interfaces, architecture, risks and 
supportability early 
• Adopt interface management guidelines based on openness, 
maturity, performance, conformance and future needs  
• Define and describe a system architecture that is traceable to the 
requirements  
• Base development on modular, hierarchical and layered 
architecture on open standards at interfaces  
• Use a cooperative process between government and industry for 
the selection of an architecture  
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• Specify key performance attributes of system building blocks 
including internal interface standards where necessary  
• Identify aspects of the program that might limit the use of an open 
systems approach  
• Link the architecture approach resulting from a system engineering 
process to a business case analysis  
• Link decisions about architecture to performance, life cycle cost, 
schedule, and risk  
• Identify opportunities for reuse of hardware and software 
configuration items and dependence upon interfaces  
• Identify the risks to the program as a result of implementing open 
systems  
• Determine which hardware and software will be reused which 
impedes open systems  
• Assure that the contract imposes necessary open system interface 
requirements upon the developer 
• Include how an open system environment will be accommodated in 
support of planning and execution 
• Adopt support drivers (product uniqueness, spares, redundancy, 
graceful degradation, fault detection and isolation, and design 
stability) influencing the maintenance philosophy and the 
interdependencies with open system implementation  
• Assess the change in maintenance approach via upgrade verses 
traditional repair and reuse 
• Assess the support infrastructure ability to accomplish technology 
insertion vice traditional repair and reuse83 
An open systems approach is an integrated engineering and business 
strategy used to choose commercially supported specifications and standards for 
selected system logical and physical interfaces, products, practices, and tools 
designed to overcome ad hoc, redundant and wasteful developmental efforts.   
MOSA is an enabler that supports program teams in the acquisition community to 
design for affordable change, employ evolutionary acquisition and spiral 
development, and develop an integrated roadmap for weapon system design and 
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development.  Basing design strategies on widely supported open standards 
increases the chance that future changes will be able to be integrated in a cost 
effective manner.  Designing a system for affordable change requires modularity.  
An evolutionary acquisition strategy provides a foundation that meets existing 
needs while providing the capability to meet evolving requirements and threats. 
An integrated roadmap is a tool for detailing the strategy to deliver a weapon 
system that is capable, upgradeable, affordable, and supportable throughout its 
planned life-cycle.   
B. AUTHOR’S OBSERVATIONS 
There have been many well-intentioned developmental initiatives and 
funding hurdles that have delayed the 2005 introduction of tomorrow’s MCM 
capabilities.  As previously mentioned, changing the culture within the Navy is 
among the challenges leaders are addressing.  Developmental initiatives that 
have the potential of expanding systems capability also bring to the forefront 
developmental delays.  Developmental initiatives such as Preplanned Product 
Improvement (P3I) are a deliberate decision delaying incorporation of a system 
capability but providing growth allocations for system capability.  This approach 
to product improvement has proven to be an instrumental way of aligning 
technology insertion through science and technology initiatives with those of the 
acquisition community.  Instead of competing against each other, simultaneous 
efforts within both communities can bring to light a capability to the warfighter in 
the form of an eighty-percent solution today vice an over reliance on unproven 
technology tomorrow.   
Let’s take for example, the AN/ASQ-20 sonar system.  This program has 
been plagued with programmatic starts and stops centered on a lack of 
developmental and fiscal commitment.  In one specific case, the science and 
technology initiative mandated by Congress to introduce an identification 
capability added an additional fielding delay to this system.  Transitioning this 
new capability into a developing system came as a programmatic and 
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managerial success story for science and technology, with the introduction of the 
EOID into the AN/AQS-20 sonar system, but it ultimately added to the delay of a 
system that has been in the development cycle for over fifteen years. Fielding the 
AN/AQS-20 in its original form, while simultaneously developing the EOID based 
on P3I initiatives would have enabled fleet introduction and validation of this new 
capability earlier than current program restructure plan estimates.  This example 
of technology insertion has been repeated across all of the next generation 
systems with lasting effects.  
The lack of cultural support has echoed across the MIW community for 
decades, with only the promise of programs that are stove-piped and in direct 
competition for limited resources.  Since the end of the Gulf War, mandates have 
been delivered from Congressional as well as senior military leaders, but since 
the end of the Gulf War little new hardware has been fielded.  The Office of Naval 
Research has been in direct competition with the acquisition community.  As 
noted above with the insertion of the EOID the science and technology 
community has declared victory with the integration of a new technology, while 
the acquisition community continues to adjust to ever changing requirements. A 
question routinely asked by fleet operators is “…why not complete a system 
before attempting to improve that system under development before it’s fielded?” 
It took just over eight years from President Kennedy’s Speech to land a man on 
the moon, but has taken more than ten years to field the first organic MCM 
system.84  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
DoD programs in general are started earlier and allow technological 
development to continue into product development and even into production, 
contrary to stable knowledge based ventures by commercial product 
development.  Consequently, the programs proceed with much more unknowns 
                                            
84 President Kennedy’s Speech to Congress took place May 25, 1961.  The Lunar Lander 
touched down July 20, 1969.  Proposed MCM programs were put in motion July 1995.  At the 
time of this thesis, none of the OMCM programs have been fielded.  
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and thus more risk about required technologies, design capability, and 
production.  Proceeding with lower levels of knowledge available explains much 
of the turbulence in DoD program outcomes.  Metrics, such as those associated 
with knowledge points, show this to be a predictable consequence.  Technology 
development has the ultimate objective of bringing a technology up to the point 
that it can be readily integrated into a new product and counted on to meet 
requirements.  As a technology is developed, it moves from a concept to a 
feasible invention to a component that must fit onto a product and function as 
expected.  Such as tomorrow’s next generation MIW system-of-systems.  The 
caveat to tomorrow’s organic MIW systems it that each system has been 
developed as a unique and distinct program, although connected to an overall 
war fighting objective, these individual programs were developed as separate 
weapons and sensors designed to meet specific sub-component requirements.   
This process of program development places crucial MIW war fighting 
capabilities in competition against each other in order to succeed and reach 
production.  The problem that has manifested as a result of this approach is an 
overall reduction in MIW capability in the near-term if at all. Let’s take for 
example the RAMICS system, which was pushed further down the development 
timeline to make funding available for other systems.  As a consequence this 
delays the only “man out of the mine field” neutralization capability in the near 
surface and shallow water environment, ultimately placing more risk on Sailors 
and Marines.   This is in stark contrast to the direction mandated by 
congressional and senior military leaders.   
The difficulties identified within this study can be mitigated with the 
incorporation of an overarching systems architecture as highlighted by the 
notional MOSA MIW framework.  This study illustrated how an overarching plan 
can serve to improve a system-of-systems development program that can field a 
more robust MIW capability to meet tomorrow’s war fighting vision, specifically 
the study recommends:  
• Developing an overall MIW capabilities architect  
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• Adherence to systems requirements 
• Develop a cultural that supports an MIW architecture 
• Provide a culture that enables a stable and committed  
development environment  
• Exercise spiral development concepts to get capability to fleet 
sooner  
• Develop a technology to counter buried mines 
• Do not phase out legacy capabilities based on un-proven 
capabilities 
• Validate system development against a traceability matrix 
• Provide funding to investigate semi-autonomous/autonomous MCM 
• Remedy important equipment shortfalls on current dedicated 
platforms 
Shortfalls such as these must be addressed if the Navy is to meet all of its 
mining and countermine warfare responsibilities in the face of a shrinking Navy 
and the growing mine warfare threat.  It has been noted there has been a serious 
imbalance in the allocation of funding and commitment for improvement of MIW 
programs.  If mine warfare is to become a partner comparable in importance with 
air, surface ship, and submarine warfare in the 21st century there must be far 
more emphasis placed on execution rather than rhetorical support.  
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